Experimental investigations of the fair wage-effort hypothesis by Meredith, Evan Edward
 
 
 
 
Experimental Investigations of the Fair Wage-Effort 
Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of  
Graduate Studies and Research 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the 
Department of Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, SK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Evan Edward Meredith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Evan Edward Meredith, June 2006. All rights reserved. 
Permission to Use 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the M.A. 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this 
University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission 
for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or part, for scholarly purposes may 
be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work, or in their 
absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my 
thesis work was done. It is understood that nay copying or publication or use of this 
project or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given me and to the 
University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material 
in my project.  
Requests for permission to copy or to make use of material in this thesis in 
whole or part should be addressed to: 
Head of the Department of Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, SK. 
S7N 5A5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I
Abstract 
 
 Neoclassical economic theory’s assumption of a strictly utility of money 
maximizing economic actor has been unable to explain such economic phenomena as 
involuntary unemployment and above market clearing wages. Efficiency wage 
theory, in its various forms, has provided some explanation for these labour market 
features. Akerlof’s (1982) Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis or Partial Gift Exchange 
model of the labour market explains involuntary unemployment through the 
productivity enhancing effects of higher wages. In Akerlof’s model this is done 
through a sort of unspoken gift exchange in which higher wages given to the workers 
are returned to the firm in the form of higher effort or productivity.  
 The Partial Gift Exchange model can also be modeled in a laboratory setting 
where its various predictions and assumptions can be tested. This has been done by a 
number of researchers over the last 15 years, who have generally found support for 
the validity of the theory using a one sided oral auction procedure. This thesis seeks 
to conduct a similar experiment, but in the form of a survey, the focus of which is the 
relationship between wages and effort.  
 A number of the results of previous experiments supporting the Fair Wage-
Effort Hypothesis have also been generated in the survey, for example a positive 
relationship between wages and effort. New and interesting findings not previously 
examined in the lab or not present in previous experiment were also present in the 
survey: the negative effect of wage inequity; a positive coefficient for the gender 
dummy variable; and the negative effect of unemployment insurance. 
 II
 The survey has produced some new and interesting results, transporting the 
survey back into the laboratory setting from which it was inspired would provide an 
interesting comparison. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 III
Acknowledgements 
 
 I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Morris Altman for his insight and 
extremely helpful suggestions. I also thank my committee members, Prof. Mobinul 
Huq and Prof. William Bishopp, and my external examiner, Prof. Li Zong, for their 
additional comments and constructive criticisms. Additional thanks to Prof. Cristina 
Echevarria and Prof. Mobinul Huq for there help in gathering survey subjects. Thanks 
also to my family for their patience and to Nikoline for becoming a temporary thesis 
widow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV
Table of Contents 
 
 
Section Page
 
 
Permission to Use                         ………………………………………………………….I
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….II
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………….……IV
List of Graphs……………………………………………………………………………...V
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..VII
 
Chapter One:  Introduction…………………………………………………………….…...1
Chapter Two: Literature Review…………………………………………………………...6
 2.1 Fairness and Reference Sets………………………………………………………6
  2.1.1 Labour: a Different Good…………………………………………………6
  2.1.2 The Importance of Fairness……………………………………………….7
  2.1.3 General Rules of Fairness…………………………………………………9
  2.1.4 Reference Transactions and Sets………………………………………...10
 2.2 The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis……………………………………………….12
  2.2.1 Motivation………………………………………………………………..12
  2.2.2 The Neoclassical Model: a simple example……………………………..13
  2.2.3 The Partial Gift Exchange Model………………………………………..13
 2.3 Labour Market Experiments……………………………………………………..16
  2.3.1 Why Labour Market Experiments?...........................................................17
  2.3.2 The Initial Experimental Design…………………………………………19
  2.3.3 Other Experiments and Extensions………………………………………22
 2.4 Experimental Investigations of Design Criticisms………………………………31
 2.5 Survey Investigations…………………………………………………………….33
 
Chapter Three: Methodology……………………………………………………………..37
 3.1 Motivation………………………………………………………………………..37
 3.2 Survey Structure…………………………………………………………………41
 3.3 Surveying Process and Recruitment……………………………………………..44
 3.4 Sample Size Selection……………………………………………………………46
 3.5 Model and Descriptions/Predictions of Variables……………………………….48
  3.5.1 The Model………………………………………………………………..48
  3.5.2 The Base Group………………………………………………………….49
  3.5.3 Descriptions and Predictions…………………………………………….50
 
Chapter Four: Results……………………………………………………………………..58
 4.1 Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………….59
  4.1.1 Description of the Sample……………………………………………….59
  4.1.2 Graphical Analysis……………………………………………………….60
  4.1.3 Effort Response Means Conditional on Wage Offers…………………...64
 V
  4.1.4 Effort Response Modes Conditional on Wage Offers…………………...68
  4.1.5 Effort Response Standard Deviations Conditional on Wage Offers…….70
  4.1.6 Accpet/Decline Percentages……………………………………………..71
 4.2 Econometric Analysis……………………………………………………………75
  4.2.1 Pooled Markets…………………………………………………………..72
   4.2.1.1 Elasticity…………………………………………………………88
  4.2.2 Separate Markets………………………………………………………...90
   4.2.2.1 Elasticity…………………………………………………………93
 4.3 Analytical/Economic Significance…..…………………………………………..94
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………98
 
Appendix One……………………………………………………………………………102
Appendix Two…………………………………………………………………………...113
Appendix Three………………………………………………………………………….127
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..129
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VI
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of graphs 
 
Graph 
 Page
1 Frequencies of Effort-Wage pairings………………………………………………61
2 Conditional Means…………………………………………………………………65
3 Conditional Modes…………………………………………………………………69
4 Conditional Standard Deviations…………………………………………………..70
5 Accept/Decline Percentages……………………………………………………….71
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 
 
 
Page
1 Cost of effort table…………………………………………………………………21
2 Possible effort response choices…………………………………………………...42
3 Definition of Variables…………………………………………………………….48
4 Descriptive Stats…………………………………………………………………...59
5 Two Sample T-Tests……………………………………………………………….64
6 Summary of Regressions (Pooled Markets)……………………………………….77
7 Marginal Effects (Pooled Markets)………………………………………………..84
8 Elasticity of Effort with respect to Wage (Pooled Markets)……………………….89
9 OLS (Separate Markets)…………………………………………………………...91
10 Probit/First stage of Conditional Model (Separate Markets)……………………..92
11 Second Stage of Conditional Model (Separate Markets)………………………...93
12 Elasticity of Effort with respect to Wage (Separate Markets)……………………94
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VII
  VIII
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
 The setting of wages above market clearing levels and workers performing 
above the minimum standards set by the firm has often conflicted with the standard 
neoclassical model of the labour market. The neoclassical model predicts that the firm 
will pay the minimum, or market clearing, wage and the worker will provide the 
minimum amount of effort necessary to retain employment. This follows from the 
neoclassical assumptions of the firm being a strict profit maximizer and the worker a 
strict utility maximizer; with tangible concepts like income or consumption the only 
arguments included in the utility or profit functions. To explain behaviour that runs 
contrary to the neoclassical model a number of theories have been developed and 
grouped under the heading of efficiency wage theory. 
 In all of the various efficiency wage theories the firm pays wages above the 
market clearing level and is compensated by an increase in productivity; how this 
increase in productivity is brought about is where the theories differ. In developing 
countries, where the workers may be malnourished, the payment of higher wages 
enables the workers to improve their health; this improvement enables them to work 
more productively (Leibenstein, 1963). The firm is compensated for the increase in 
the wage bill by an increase in productive output. The higher wages may also allow 
the firm to attract more productive workers when advertising for job openings or to 
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keep the workers it currently has employed from leaving. Another theory involves the 
concept of shirking or slacking off at work (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The 
relatively higher wages increase the cost of getting fired if caught shirking; therefore 
employees are less likely to shirk and a more productive environment transpires. 
The most interesting form of efficiency wage theory, and the focus of this 
paper, is that wages affect worker effort through a partial gift exchange framework. 
This theory was first developed by Akerloff (1982) and later elaborated upon in 
Akerloff and Yellen (2004). The degree to which this partial gift exchange takes 
place is based the evaluation of the level of fairness present in the transaction. The 
theory provides an easily understood explanation of the high wages and effort that 
conflict with the neoclassical theory. In addition to it’s simply explanation, it also is 
easily tested in laboratory experiments first developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Riedl (1993). In Chapter Two this paper provides an overview of the importance of 
including considerations of fairness in labour market transactions, as modeled in 
Akerloff’s (1982) partial gift exchange model, and a review of the various laboratory 
experiments designed to examine the role of fairness in the labour market.  
In an attempt to transpose this experimental framework from a lab experiment 
to a survey experiment, a survey was developed to test whether the lab experiment 
results could be replicated in a survey format. In addition to this test of replication a 
number of new labour market features were included in the survey: an unemployment 
benefit; the knowledge of co-worker wages; and a high degree of supervision. The 
development and implementation of this survey is detailed in Chapter Three. From 
the predictions of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis, or Partial Gift Exchange Model, 
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and the results of previous experiments, four Hypotheses regarding the outcome of 
the survey were posed. They are outlined below. 
 
Hypothesis A: 
Effort is positively correlated with wages. Higher wages will correspond to a 
higher choice of effort. 
 
This hypothesis is a straightforward prediction of the fair wage-effort model 
and has been a result of the previous experimental studies, with the noted exception 
of Rigdon (2002). 
Hypothesis B:
An increase in possible unemployment benefits will reduce the amount of effort 
for a corresponding wage from the effort put forth in the absence of 
unemployment benefits. As unemployment benefits increase, the workers 
conception of a fair wage also increases, and to elicit the same effort as previous 
a higher wage must be offered. 
 
 Unemployment benefits are included in the reference wage as an alternative to 
employment. As they increase this alternative becomes more attractive. They also 
contribute to the employee’s conception of a fair wage. As the benefits increase so 
does the fair wage.  
Hypothesis C: 
 
The observance of a coworkers’ wage will have negative effects on effort for a 
wage lower than the coworkers and positive effects on effort for a wage higher 
than the coworkers. Workers base their evaluation of the fairness of the wage 
offer on the reference point of similar worker’s wages. If their wages are lower 
they will regard the wage unfair and reduce their effort accordingly. If their 
wages are higher they will regard the wage as exceeding the fair wage and will 
increase their effort accordingly. 
 
 Co-worker wages, like unemployment benefits, are also included in the 
reference wage. Increases in a relatively similar co-worker’s wages, holding the other 
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worker’s wages constant, would raise the other worker’s conception of what 
constitutes a fair wage. Co-worker wages have been examined before in a lab setting 
by Charness and Kuhn (2004). They found that wage inequality had no effect on the 
relatively lower paid workers effort. 
  
Hypothesis D: 
 
The degree to which workers are supervised or monitored will have an effect on 
the effort they put forth. Working under a small degree of monitoring reduces 
the chances of being caught shirking. Workers who have a high degree of 
supervision will find it difficult to shirk without detection. Therefore the level of 
effort under a high degree of supervision will be higher than under low 
supervision. 
 
 The degree of supervision has only been examined by Rigdon (2002), who 
found that in the absence of supervision the market reverted to the neoclassical 
model’s predictions. In contrast, Hypothesis D predicts the behaviour of workers who 
experience a high degree of supervision. It maintains that workers who receive higher 
levels of supervision put forth more effort. 
This may not always be the case; low supervision need not lead to low levels 
of effort inputs. The extent to which minimal supervision affects the effort of workers 
depends on the work culture of the firm; high levels of effort inputs can be 
harmonious with minimal supervision (Altman, 2002).  The hypothesis formed here 
stems from the previous experimental results (Rigdon, 2002) and predicts a positive 
correlation between effort and supervision. 
 An examination of the data generated by the survey is presented in Chapter 
Four. The basic results are a complete acceptance of Hypothesis A, partial acceptance 
of Hypotheses B and C, and a rejection of Hypothesis D. In addition to these 
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decisions there were two other results of note: gender plays a significant role in the 
wage-effort relationship; and place of origin also plays a significant role in the wage-
effort relationship, though not as economically significant as the role of gender. 
These two interesting results are in opposition to the findings of previous 
experiments. For a more detailed examination of the previous experiments, the 
methodology of the survey and the results extracted from the gathered survey data, 
please read on. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
 This chapter presents the literature that forms the basis for this thesis. The 
importance of fairness in the labour market and the use of reference sets to evaluate 
fairness are detailed in the first section of this chapter. This is followed by a summary 
of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis, or Partial Gift Exchange Model of the labour 
market, developed by Akerlof (1982). Lastly a survey of the lab experiments testing 
the validity of the fair wage-effort hypothesis is given. A few survey investigations 
into the fair wage-effort hypothesis are also outlined in this section. This then leads 
into the next chapter, a discussion of the survey construction and implementation 
used in this thesis. 
 
2.1 Fairness and Reference Sets 
 
2.1.1 Labour: A Different Good 
 The need to treat labour markets differently than other goods markets is 
stressed in the work of a number of economists. The selling of labour is different 
from other market goods because a job not provides a source of income, but also a 
large status symbol and source of pride for many workers (Solow, 1990). The 
derivation of pride from employment stems partly from the level of the wage you are 
paid relative to the position you occupy. Undercutting the wages of others and selling 
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yourself cheaper is a debasement of the self and is often seen as shameful (Solow, 
1990). The debasement of one’s self has negative effects on the individual’s utility 
outside of the lower wage received by undercutting wages. The level of wage under 
which accepting employment becomes detrimental to one’s utility depends on the 
concept of fairness and whether the wage violates the norms that govern what 
constitutes a fair wage. In order to compensate for the loss in utility, from lower 
wages and the violation of fairness norms, the worker may lower the level of effort 
they put forward in their job; this helps to compensate for the utility loss because 
effort provision is costly. Reducing effort also allows for the worker to punish the 
firm, for what it views as disregarding general norms of fairness, through reduced 
output and possibly even active revenge, like sabotage. The need to treat labour 
different from other goods leads to the inclusion of perceptions of fairness, and the 
norms which govern this perception, when examining labour markets. 
 
2.1.2 The Importance of Fairness 
 Outside of the field of economics fairness has often been an important factor. 
An oft found example of this is in union wage contracts. In these contracts there 
commonly exists a clause which states that an increase in wages for another union, 
which has workers of a similar occupation, must be accompanied by an increase in 
wages for the original union’s workers (Rees, 1993). This increase in wages is in line 
with the need to conform to a norm of fairness regarding maintaining wage equity 
across occupations. It should be noted that fairness is primarily a supply side 
consideration; it is the workers which insist on fairness, not the firms. It is through 
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the possibility of increased productivity, or retaliation, that firms take fairness under 
consideration; causing a demand side effect as well (Rees, 1993). The violation of 
fairness norms, like not observing union wage equity clauses, can have negative 
effects for the firm: increased turnover of workers; decreases of effort and 
productivity; increased shirking; and possibly strikes (Rees, 1993). While the 
negative effects of not taking fairness into account when setting wages are well 
illustrated in this example, the possible positive effects, outside of an absence of the 
negative ones, are not as clear. 
 The importance of fairness can also be found in the field of Human Resources 
and Management. Human Resource textbooks and manuals, which train people who 
will later on be involved in the setting of wages, impart the knowledge that equity and 
perceived equity are indispensable to good industrial relations (Solow, 1990). In the 
absence of fair wages the management will experience high levels of quits, low 
morale and the accompanying low productivity; just like in the union example. 
 Albert Rees (1993) provides more anecdotal evidence; in all the various 
positions he held, regarding wage determination, he found that neoclassical theory 
was not of much help. Fairness was found to be an overwhelming factor in the 
determination of wages. Wages are not fully determined by market forces, but 
through collective, or individual, bargaining in which fairness plays a very important 
part. 
 The importance of fairness can be seen in other areas of economics besides 
labour markets. In Ultimatum and Dictator Games a movement towards fair 
outcomes, and a willingness to resist an unfair outcome, have been reported; the 
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outcome dictated by neoclassical theory, in which fairness in not considered, is often 
not observed. Fair offers and acceptances, with occasional refusals if the offer is too 
low, are the common results for these laboratory games1 (Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler, 1986a). These fair outcomes also occur under strict anonymity with no option 
of retaliation. In the Ultimatum game in the second, or punishment, stage the 
participants showed willingness to punish an unfair allocator, and simultaneously 
reward a fair one, with a clear majority of 74% (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 
1986a). The behaviour observed in these games gives further credence to the 
importance of fairness in economic transactions. 
 
2.1.3 General Rules of Fairness 
 The importance of considering fairness when examining labour markets has 
been outlined in the previous section. To further our understanding of fairness, what 
factors lead to a situation’s fairness must be examined. To examine the evaluating of 
fairness general rules of fairness and the concept of a reference set, or reference 
transaction, must be developed. 
 In a series of surveys conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986b) 
fairness was found to play an important role in a number of economic transactions. In 
the surveys questions regarding a firm’s actions, in a price or wage setting decision 
affecting one or more of the transactors, were evaluated as acceptable or unfair by the 
respondents. The results of the surveys lead the authors to offer propositions about 
labour market behaviour: wages will be relatively insensitive to excess supply; firms 
                                                 
1 For an explanation of the exact mechanics of Ultimatum and other experimental bargaining games 
see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a). 
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may cut wages to protect a profit similar to their reference profit; and a number of 
other points less relevant to labour market transactions. 
 In another paper Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a) develop two general 
rules for fairness that are similar to the two mentioned above; these two rules are 
more formal statements of the ones described above. The first is that it is unfair for a 
firm to exploit an increase in market power to alter the terms of the reference 
transaction at the direct expense of a customer, tenant or employee. The second states 
that it is acceptable for a firm to maintain its profit at the reference level by raising 
prices or by cutting costs as necessary. In order to understand these rules a more in-
depth discussion of what is a reference set, or transaction, is necessary; as reference 
sets figure prominently in the fair wage effort hypothesis. 
2.1.4 Reference Transactions and Sets 
 A reference transaction is a previous transaction which the specific bargainers, 
or bargainers whom the specific bargainers judge to be similar, were involved in and 
regard as a benchmark of what constitutes fair activity. A reference transaction can 
consist of market prices, posted prices, and the history of transactions between the 
two bargainers (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986b). For instance the firm may 
consider the profit levels they have maintained for over a previous number of years to 
be their reference profit. Akerloff’s (1982) Partial Gift Exchange Model is concerned 
with the reference set and the behaviour of workers, so the reference transaction is 
abandoned at this point. 
 The reference set is made up of all the factors which the worker uses to judge 
the degree of fairness contained in their current situation. This set may not always 
 10
seem rational to the outside observer; only to the individual using the reference set. 
The most common elements of the set are the wages paid to other workers who are 
thought to be in similar situations to the individual. These wage, or compensation, 
comparisons are made with another union, employer, or worker (Rees, 1993). As 
mentioned previously, unions often use workers in similar occupations to determine 
whether an increase in wages in necessary for their own members. This conforms to 
the individuals need to maintain their reference set level of wage equity to maintain 
fairness and a acceptable level; along with their utility levels being maintained.  
 Reference sets are not always perfectly rational and are subject to both 
framing effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986a) and self serving biases 
(Charness and Harvey, 2000). These effects may lead to the perception of the 
reference set as being irrational. 
 A number of possible modifications of the neoclassical theory may be made to 
present a more realistic representation of reality and to help explain phenomena, like 
involuntary unemployment, that seem at odds to its predictions. Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986a) suggest that a more realistic description of transactors should 
include caring about receiving fair treatment, a willingness to resist unfair firms at a 
cost to the individual and systematic rules that specify which actions of firms are 
considered unfair. Rees (1993) recommends that the utility functions of the 
employees not only contain the arguments wages and leisure, but also the wages of 
others in the reference set; which would enter the function in a negative manner. 
Akerloff’s (1982) Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis, which is presented in the following 
section, takes both these suggestions into account. 
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2.2 The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
 In the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis, or Partial Gift Exchange Model, the 
employer provides a gift to the employee in the form of a wage, which is higher than 
market clearing, and the employee reciprocated with the provision of effort above the 
minimum requirements set forth by the firm. This model is used to explain 
involuntary unemployment and the theory of dual labour markets; in which there 
exists a primary market, where the gift component is large enough to permit higher 
than market clearing levels, and the secondary market, where market clearing 
persists. An earlier simpler model in which effort levels are tied to wages is presented 
in Solow (1979). 
 
2.2.1 Motivations 
Akerloff’s interest in exchange of this type follows from Homan’s (1953, 
cited in Akerloff, 1982) study of cash posters at a utility company. The study found 
that production exceeded the minimum required from the company. The increased 
production was not considered to be the result of an attempt at promotion; there was 
little room for it and the level of voluntary quits was quite high. It was also not 
considered to be stemming from the threat of punishment; for falling below the 
minimum standard the worker was only given a mild rebuke. Akerloff (1982) 
considers these observations to be in conflict with neoclassical theory. Why did the 
workers not reduce their output to the minimum requirement? Why did the firm not 
raise the standard high and fire those who fell short? The explanation for these 
questions is that workers provide effort above the minimum requirement and in return 
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require a fair reward or compensation for their efforts. What this fair treatment is may 
differ between groups or individuals; Akerloff (1982) considers leniency for the 
worker from the employer if their output were to fall, but later drops this to 
concentrate on the concept of a fair wage. 
2.2.2 The Neoclassical Model: a simple example 
 Before diving into the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis it may be helpful to 
briefly explain how the effort and wages would be set under neoclassical assumptions 
using a simple model. The workers in this example (Akerlof, 1982) have utility 
functions which include the wage paid and the effort they put forth as arguments. 
U=(w,e) 
If firms were to pay a wage and make it necessary to perform to some minimum work 
standard, e-min, the employee would then set their effort equal to the minimum 
necessary to maintain employment. In maximizing utility, for the worker, and profit, 
for the firm, both economic actors will expect the other to set the choice variables 
equal to the minimum and the equilibrium will result in a market clearing wage and 
minimum effort on behalf of the workers. In order to modify the model to be more 
consistent with empirical observations the objective functions of the firm and worker 
must be changed. 
 
2.2.3 The Partial Gift Exchange Model 
 The modification presented by Akerlof (1982) is that fairness exerts an 
influence on the market through its effects on workers effort provision. The gift 
exchange is a higher than market clearing wage, from the firm to the worker, and a 
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higher than minimum required effort, from the worker to the firm; the magnitude of 
which is affected by the perceptions of the fairness apparent in the transaction. This 
exchange could be beneficial to both parties. The worker is receiving a higher wage, 
which would offset the cost of providing higher effort, and the firm a higher level of 
effort or productivity, which would offset the cost of paying a higher wage. To be 
beneficial the costs of the gifts being provided must be more than merely offset by the 
gifts received; the employee must receive a wage that would more than compensate 
for the higher level of effort provided. The equilibrium in this situation would result 
in higher than market clearing wages, effort above the minimum requirement, sticky 
wages and involuntary unemployment. 
 Akerlof (1982) calls this type of exchange a partial gift exchange. Each party 
has an expectation that if not met would cause the exchange to cease; the partial gift 
exchange would revert back to the neoclassical model discussed previously. The 
firms expect higher effort for their higher wages and the workers expect higher wages 
for their higher effort; it is not a fully altruistic exchange.  
 The model states very simply that fair behaviour will result in higher effort 
and higher wages. What exactly is fair behaviour will be dependant on the actors’ 
reference sets. With regards to effort provision, what is fair will be based upon norms 
concerned with what constitutes a fair day’s work. This will be based upon the 
comparison of one’s own effort with others in the worker’s of firm’s reference set 
(Akerloff, 1982). The determination of the firm’s minimum work standards will be 
based upon the performance of past workers or workers at similar firms. 
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 A more formal statement of what is contained in a worker’s reference set in 
Akerlof’s (1982) model is presented below. 
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These factors all influence the worker’s conception of what is a fair wage given the 
current situation. The failure of a firm to pay a wage which is greater that or equal to 
this fair wage will result in a lack of reciprocation on behalf of the workers. It should 
also be included in this function that a firm’s profit opportunities play an important 
role in the determination of a fair wage. Higher profitability opportunities for a firm 
would require a higher fair wage; this is in line with Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler’s (1986a) general rules of fairness.  
 Akerlof (1982) then develops a mathematical model2 which maintains the 
neoclassical assumptions of utility or profit maximization, but includes the possibility 
of variable effort provision; which is affected by the evaluation of the fairness of the 
wage being offered. Putting this model through theoretical examples, the first 
involving fixed work rules and adjustable wages, the second with fixed wages and 
adjustable work rules, he finds that involuntary unemployment will result. The 
                                                 
2 The concern of this paper is with the experimental tests of this model, so the exact mathematical 
mechanics of the model are not presented; see Akerlof  (1982) for the algebraic workings of the model. 
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resulting wages and effort will be above the levels that the strictly neoclassical 
example dictates; neither work rules nor wages can be adjusted to equate supply and 
demand and clear the markets.  
 Uniqueness of the efficiency wage generated by the Akerlof (1982) model is a 
product of the shape of the wage-productivity curve used. Alternative wage-
productivity curves such as a quasi-linear shape (Altman, 2001), or other shapes 
(Stiglitz, 1987), allow for a range of non-unique efficiency wages. Models using 
these alternative curves may clear; the Akerlof (1982) model does not clear the 
markets because of the assumption of a unique efficiency wage. 
 The theoretical model presented by Akerlof (1982) provides a very 
compelling explanation for involuntary markets and the payment of wages above 
market clearing levels. In addition to the explanation given for these phenomena, the 
model is also easily tested in laboratory experiments; the results of which generally 
conform to the predictions of the theoretical model. 
 
2.3 Labour Market Experiments 
 
 As attractive as mathematical models can be, many researchers like Gary 
Charness(2004); Ernst Fehr, Erich Kirchler, Andreas Weichbold, and Simon Gatcher 
(1998); R. Lynn Hannan, John H. Kagel, and Donald V. Moser (2002); and others; 
have  extended the work of earlier experimental economists like Vernon Smith (1976, 
1989, 1991)3 and developed experimental or simulated labour markets to test the 
                                                 
3 There are just a few of the papers Smith has written regarding experimental economics. For a in 
depth examination of the works of Vernon Smith see Altman (2004a). 
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partial gift exchange theory. The experiments differ in certain ways, like how the 
wages are determined (Charness, 2004) or examining subject pool differences 
(Hannan, Kagel, and Moser, 2002). Aside from their differences, a common result is 
that higher wages lead to higher effort provision; though the magnitude of this varies 
as the experiments differ. 
 
2.3.1 Why Labour Market Experiments? 
 The advantages of using labour market experiments to test theories and their 
predictions or assumptions are numerous. For example, they allow for the direct 
testing of assumptions and predictions; with the ability to control for a number of 
environmental factors which may be present in field data (Falk and Fehr, 2003). 
Vernon Smith (1976) points to two reasons for the importance of experimental 
methods in the evolution of economic theory: they allow for the pretesting of 
economic theory before the use of field data tests; and they can be directly important 
to the field data’s study and interpretation. These and other advantages of the 
laboratory have lead to a rich literature on the implementation and interpretation of 
laboratory methods and results.4
These labour market experiments have attempted to adhere to Vernon Smith’s 
experimental design methods: the use of salient pay or induced value theory (Smith, 
1976); and trying to maintain as close a relationship with reality as possible. Whether 
or not they have succeeded in this is subject to debate. 
These experiments are not without their problems and a variety of criticisms 
and objections have been put forth: subject pool bias due to the majority of subjects 
                                                 
4 See Kagel and Roth ( 1995) for a collection of experimental economics literature. 
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being students; small numbers of participants; invalid stake sizes; and too simple 
abstractions from reality (Falk and Fehr, 2003). These problems may be dealt with 
through careful sample selection, inference and experimental design; addressing them 
directly is also an option as Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougevera (2002) do with the 
problem of small stake size and as Gneezy (2003) does with the problem of the 
absence of real effort provision. Small stake size is often criticized as leading the 
participants to not take the experiment seriously; the wager on each individual 
transaction is often less then one dollar, whereas in reality the wages and behaviour of 
the worker can have a large impact on their livelihoods. The numerical choice of 
effort instead of actually doing some physical or mental task is also thought by critics 
to lead to a lack of seriousness on behalf of the participants; there is no real cost of 
effort outside of how it may affect their earnings. These two problems are addressed 
directly by replacing the small stakes with very high ones, three times the 
participants’ monthly incomes (Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougavera, 2002), and by 
requiring the participants to provide some concrete level of effort, like having them 
solve a mazes on a computer (Gneezy, 2003). Properly designed and conducted 
experiments can deal with the problems mentioned and will generate a more realistic 
picture of human nature while enhancing our understanding of how labour markets 
function (Falk and Fehr, 2003). 
 
 
2.3.2 The Initial Experimental Design 
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 As previously mentioned the Fair Wage-Effort, or Partial Gift Exchange, 
model of the labour market and its implications can be easily tested using laboratory 
experiments; the first of which was conducted by Fehr, Krichsteiger, and Riedl 
(1993). This investigation also set forth the basic laboratory method for 
experimentation of this kind and has been used by other researchers in the same 
manner, or with minor modifications.  
 The design consists of what is called a one sided oral auction and consists of 
two stages. Initially the participants were gathered into one room and explained the 
mechanics of the auction; they were then divided into two groups randomly and 
separated into two rooms, between which contact was conducted by the investigators 
using a telephone. The auction then started. The first stage involves the employers 
offering wages to a group of potential employees; they have no choice in specifying 
an individual employee to offer a wage to. The wage offers had to be in multiples of 
five and the wage offering stage of the auction lasted three minutes. If the employer 
found that their wage offer was not being accepted they could change the offer, but 
only upward. If the wage was accepted by an employee a binding contract was 
formed; if the employer found no acceptance after the three minutes was up they 
earned no profits that round. After contracts were formed the second stage began. In 
this stage the employees chose a level of effort, which was costly to them, to provide 
to the employer, which entered positively in the production function of the employer. 
This choice was revealed only to the specific employer they had formed a contract 
with and the employer also had no knowledge of exactly whom the contract had been 
formed with; this was to prevent a reputational equilibrium. After this was completed 
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the employers and employees then calculated their payoffs for that round; then the 
next round commenced. In order to keep possible productive of human capital 
differences between participants the same, payoff functions were provided to them; 
these functions differ slightly from study to study but retain the same basic structure. 
A cost of effort table was also provided to the workers to keep the cost of effort the 
same for each individual. With regards to information, everyone knew the payoff 
functions of firms and workers, the cost of effort schedule, and the wage offers. The 
private information was limited to the effort provided to the specific employer and the 
anonymity of the individuals forming the contract. These two stages and payoff 
functions, and cost of effort table, form the basic structure of the laboratory 
experiment. 
 Using this structure Fehr, Kirchstieger, and Reidl (1993) conducted an 
experiment using four sessions consisting of one trial period and twelve periods of 
actual experimentation. The sessions lasted approximately two hours with the average 
subject earning $25 per session. In each session the number of workers was greater 
than the number of employers to create competitive pressure. The payoff functions 
imposed on the participants were as follows. 
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Where c is a fixed cost of employment, p is the wage, m(e) is the cost of  provision of 
the effort level selected, v is the productive capacity of the firm and e is the effort 
level chosen. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl (1993) fixed the values of v and c, at 126 
and 26, while providing a cost of effort table, which is presented below in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Cost of Effort Choice Table 
 
e 
 
 
0.1 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 
 
0.4 
 
0.5 
 
0.6 
 
0.7 
 
0.8 
 
0.9 
 
1.0 
 
m(e) 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
 
6 
 
8 
 
10 
 
12 
 
15 
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These values were chosen to eliminate the possibility of losses for the firm; in order 
to eradicate possible loss aversion behaviour. 
 Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl (1993) then conduct the experiment to test the 
implications of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis’s implications that the effort level is 
increasing in the wage, average wages are considerably greater than market clearing, 
the wage does not converge towards market clearing and average effort is above the 
minimum. Market clearing in this investigation is where supply is equal to demand, 
given the payoff functions imposed and the competitive pressures; minimum levels of 
effort would be a choice of e = 0.1 with a cost of m(e) = 0. 
 The results of the experiment support the theories implications: average effort 
was four times higher than as predicted by the neoclassical model; the average and 
median effort level increased with the wage; regressing effort on wage and a constant 
resulted in a coefficient on wage than is positive and highly significant; dummy 
period variables indicate workers to not behave significantly different across periods; 
the average payment is above, and does not converge towards, market clearing; and 
the average effort level was above the minimum in every session in all periods. 
 To investigate further and to examine why the participants behaved as they 
did a follow up survey was conducted. In order to lend support to the observation of 
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involuntary unemployment, those employees who did not accept a wage offer were 
asked why; in only 10 of the 144 cases was an answer given of no acceptable offer 
was available. The rest of the workers would have liked to worked, but were unable 
to find an offer due to the competitive pressure in the market; their unemployment 
was involuntary (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl, 1993). To examine the behaviour of 
firms, the firms were asked why they offered the higher than minimum wages; the 
response was that they were trying to coax a higher level of effort from the workers 
(Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl, 1993). The possibility that this behaviour is 
maintained by some sort of group reputation is refuted by the observation that the 
high wages and effort are still present in the final period. All the participants knew 
when the session was to end, so why did they not reduce their wages or effort in the 
final period; this contradicts the group reputation explanation (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Reidl, 1993). 
 While being supportive of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis the experiment 
has many criticisms, like too low stakes or subject pool homogeneity. Further 
experiments, conducted using the same framework, have been used to examine these 
and other criticisms or behaviour. 
 
2.3.3 Other Experiments and Extensions 
 To examine if differing profitability opportunities for the firm affect the 
behaviour of the participants in the experiment, as they would in the fair wage effort 
hypothesis, Fehr and Gatcher (1998) implemented an experiment similar to the basic 
design of Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl (1993). The main difference being that firms 
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differed in their profitability and there also existed a possibility for the firms to 
punish or reward the workers if the effort level provided was not in line with the 
firms expectations. The payoff functions also slightly differed and are given below. 
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Where q is the redemption, or profitability, value of the firm, w is the wage, e is the 
effort level provided, c(e) is the cost of providing that effort, f is the fixed cost of 
working, p is the punishment value and k(p) is the cost of dealing that punishment . 
 The experiment consisted of 16 periods in which a three stage auction was 
conducted. The first stage was the wage offer and acceptance stage, this time the 
workers chose among the wages in a randomly determined order. In the second stage 
the workers were informed of their employer’s redemption value and chose a level of 
effort to provide, along with incurring its cost of provision. In the third stage, firms 
were informed of the effort level provided and could elect to punish or reward their 
employee with a choice of p<1 or p>1; this choice came with a cost k(p), with k(1) = 
0.  
 The results indicate that the firms chose to punish or reward despite its cost to 
them, workers display a highly significant positive wage effort relationship even 
when controlling for redemption values and in the first stage firms pay a wage that is 
positively correlated to their redemption value (Fehr and Gatcher, 1998). 
 In a very similar experiment to their 1993 paper Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl 
(1998) conduct another experiment; the difference being that participants were called 
 23
buyers and seller, not firms and workers. The change led to no significant differences 
in the results.  
 In an experiment to determine whether the results of previous investigations 
represented non-competitive outcomes, Fehr, Weichbold, and Gatcher (1998) 
conducted an experiment with three different markets: a bilateral gift exchange 
(BGE); a gift exchange market (GEM); and a complete contract market (CCM). The 
GEM is a replication of the basic design, in the CCM all wage offers come with a 
required level of effort that has to be honoured and in the BGE all the workers are 
matched with all the firms in a sequence; eliminating any competition for jobs. 
Comparing the GEM with the CCM provides evidence of whether the high wages in 
the GEM are due to high reservation wages. Comparing the BGE with the GEM 
allows a determination of whether competition plays a role in the GEM.  
 In an experiment similar to the CCM Hannan, Kagel, and Moser (2002) 
investigated the effect of effort proposals on behaviour; in this case the proposals did 
not have to be honoured. They found that the requests for effort were only partially 
honoured by the workers. 
 The results of the experiment adhered to the predictions and assumptions of 
the fair wage effort hypothesis. In the BGE and the GEM effort is positively 
correlated with wages and there is no tendency for this to decline over time. At the 
aggregate level the higher wages in the BGE and GEM elicited higher effort 
provision. Tobit regressions found a positive, stable and highly significant wage 
coefficient; the square of the wage was negative in both the BGE and GEM 
regressions, but only significant in the BGE, indicating a concave relationship in the 
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BGE, but not the GEM. The inclusion of individual dummy variables found highly 
significant individual effects; period effect dummy coefficients were found to 
insignificant, but always had positive slopes which did not vary over periods, 
indicating no decline in reciprocity over time. These statistical examinations lead to 
results which conform to Akerlof’s (1982) model.  
 When comparing the results of the three markets; Fehr, Weichbold, and 
Gatcher (1998) conclude that the high wage in the GEM are not due to high 
reservation wages, or compensating differentials, and the wage offered in the GEM is 
a non-competitive wage. The average wages in the GEM are initially significantly 
lower than those in the BGE, but from period five onwards it is difficult to see any 
difference; the conclusion is that the wage depressing effects of competition are only 
temporary. 
 In addition to investigating the above questions Fehr, Weichbold, and Gatcher 
(1998) also examine possible subject pool effects. They compared the results of using 
a group of soldiers as subjects to the results obtained using students. They found the 
wages of the students to be lower that those of the soldiers; indicating subject pool 
differences are present. Hannan, Kagel, and Moser (2002) also found subject pool 
differences when comparing MBA students and undergraduates; the MBA students 
provided more effort and received higher wages on average. 
 To examine what role, if any, the responsibility alleviation effect has on an 
experiment of this type, Charness (2000) conducted an investigation using the basic 
model of experimentation. The responsibility alleviation effect states that shifting 
responsibility for an outcome to an external authority dampens the internal impulse 
 25
towards honesty, loyalty and generosity; efficiency and performance may be affected 
by this. Charness (2000) acknowledges that previous experiments have reported 
positive wage effort correlation, but have only examined the case when firms 
determine wages. Charness (2000) examines what effect the determination of wages 
by a third party, or random mechanism, has on worker behaviour.  
 The experiment was the same as Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl (1998), except 
that the employer could not determine the wage and the employee could not reject the 
offer. Four sessions were conducted, two in which the wage was determined 
randomly by a bingo cage drawing and two in which the same random wages were 
attributed to a third party by the investigators; each employee was only in one of the 
sessions.  
 The responsibility alleviation effect, that employees will provide higher effort 
levels when a wage has been randomly determined than when determined by a third 
party, is present in the results; high effort provision is much more common in the 
random wage sessions (Charness, 2002). The conclusion reached by Charness (2002) 
is that third party intervention has a slight negative effect on the level of effort 
provided. This may be applied to minimum wage debates; which can be seen as third 
party intervention in wage setting.  
 Charness (2004) conducted another experiment which was the same as 
Charness (2002), but this time included a session in which firms determined wages. 
The results which show a positive wage-effort correlation across all treatments, but 
with much higher coefficients in the employer determined wage treatment than in the 
random or third party sessions. 
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 To examine the impact that minimum wage and the direction of competition 
may have on the behaviour of participants in the experiment, Brandts and Charness 
(2004) conducted an experiment consisting of 16 sessions; twelve of which were 
multi-period sessions and four one shot sessions. Of the twelve multi-period sessions 
four had an excess supply of firms (ESF), four contained and excess supply of 
workers (ESL) and four had a minimum wage with an excess supply of workers 
(MW). The range of wage and effort levels was limited to (0,10), in the absence of a 
minimum wage, and to (5,10), in the presence of minimum wage (min wage = 5). The 
one shot games had different payoff functions, than the multi-period sessions, to 
offset the different payouts subjects would receive at the end of the session. The 
conduct of the sessions was the same as the basic design (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Reidl, 1993). 
 The results of the experiment show that patterns in the ESF and ESL are 
similar, with a modal outcome of wage = 10 and effort = 10. With the addition of 
minimum wage, the MW session, the number of times a wage of 10 is offered drops 
dramatically. In the ESF and ESL session the effort provided rarely exceeded the 
wage offered and in the final period there was a substantial drop in both. Random 
effects ordered probit regressions, including wages along with period and treatment 
dummies, had significant positive wage coefficients and significant negative period 
coefficients, for the final two periods, in all sessions. Differences in wages between 
the ESL and the ESF are small and not significant. When comparing the ESL and 
MW regressions there is no significant differences in wages when considering all 
levels of wage, but when examining wages of at least 5, the wages in the ESL are 
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higher; overall effort is also lower in the MW sessions when comparing wages of at 
least five. 
 Differences in competitive direction are found to play a very small role in this 
experiment. This is consistent with Akerlof’s (1982) theory and the results of 
previous experiments, which find a high degree of gift exchange despite competitive 
pressure. The imposition of a minimum wage was found to have an effect, a negative 
effect on effort provision and wages. This conforms to Charness (2000) and the 
responsibility alleviation effect; third party intervention, in the form of a minimum 
wage, reduces the degree of gift exchange. 
Seeking to examine the role that intentions may play in the labour market, 
Charness and Levine (2003) designed and implemented an experiment that allows for 
the intentions of firms to enter prominently in the choice of the workers effort. This 
experiment is inspired from the concepts of procedural and distributive justice. 
Distributive justice is concerned primarily with the outcome of a situation while 
procedural justice is also concerned with the path that has arrived at the outcome. To 
illuminate these concepts further Charness and Levine (2003) present a comparison of 
murder and manslaughter. While both these criminal charges spring from the same 
situation, a taken life, the intentions of the perpetrators in both situations are very 
different. Distributive justice would make no distinction between these two crimes. 
Procedural justice would note a very relevant difference and this is reflected in the 
possible sentences for these crimes.  
 To incorporate this concept into an experimental labour market Charness and 
Levine (2003) included the possibility of business conditions changing after the wage 
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offer has been made. The firms offered either a high or low wage and then the flip of 
a coin determined whether the condition was favorable or unfavorable. Favorable 
conditions increased the wage and unfavorable conditions decreased the wage. Two 
sessions were run, one in which the business conditions did not affect the firms 
payoff and one in which they did. This presents two paths in which the wage to the 
worker is the same:  high wage and poor conditions; and low wage and good business 
conditions. The degree to which the effort choices differ between these two situations 
would indicate the relevance of the firm’s intentions in the labour market. 
 Charness and Levine (2003) find that the wage itself is related positively to 
effort, similar to the previous experiments, and that there is a significant difference in 
effort between the two paths leading to the same wage. This indicated that the 
intentions of firms, in the wage setting process, are taken into account by the worker 
when making a effort choice decision. 
Coworker wages are an important part of the reference wage theory. When 
making a comparison to evaluate the fairness of their wage the first place a worker 
may look is the wages that others in the firm are being paid. It is easily the most 
available and easy comparison to make. Charness and Kuhn (2004) extended the 
basic experimental labour market design to allow for two differently productive 
workers to be employed by each firm. 
 The pair of workers employed by each firm entered differently into the firm’s 
payoff function, this is where the difference in productivity is made. The more 
productive worker provided a higher payoff to the firm, than the lesser productive 
one, for the same wage offer. The firm knew which worker was the more productive 
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one, but the pair of workers knew only that one was differently productive than the 
other, not which one was more productive. The payoff functions and the cost of effort 
table were the same for all workers. Two different sessions were run with this same 
structure, the difference being that wage offers in the first were private knowledge 
and in the second were public. This was to observe whether wage secrecy may 
influence the firms wage offers. 
 The results of the experiment indicate that workers are far more concerned 
with their own wages than those of their coworkers. The wage of coworkers had no 
significant influence on the effort decisions of the other worker. The workers own 
wages had a significant positive effect, similar to the previous experimental findings. 
The firms were more likely to compress the wages when they were public knowledge 
than when they were private, mirroring the common practice of firms to institute 
wage secrecy. In this experiment firms may have overestimated the workers reaction 
to wage differentials. 
These experiments all derive their design from Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl 
(1993), but differ in certain ways to examine varying aspects of the labour market and 
Akerlof’s (1982) theory. One common result is that the experiments generated data 
which is consistent with the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis or Partial Gift Exchange 
Model of the labour market. These experiments also have their own critics and 
detractors, who raise a number of relevant points regarding the validity of the data 
generated by the experiments. A number of these points have been examined directly 
using modifications of the basic design, these investigations are detailed in the 
following section. 
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 2.4 Experimental Investigations of Design Criticisms 
 
 The first of these objections to be addressed was that the presence of the 
experimenters, in the lab, causes the participants to act more generously than they 
would under complete anonymity; a feature that may be more common in reality. 
Rigdon (2002) implemented an experiment, using computers, which allowed for 
complete anonymity in the transactions. The lack of a presence of investigators in the 
lab is meant to model a situation under which the firm finds it to costly to observe 
worker effort and output; this is stated, by Rigdon (2002), to be a reality that many 
firms face. Another criticism that is acknowledged by this study, is that the marginal 
cost of effort provision used previously was too low. The marginal cost structure used 
in this study was much more restrictive. 
 The results have wage and effort levels converging to the minimum levels 
predicted by the neoclassical theory. Employees tend to shirk on agreements; the firm 
initially attempts a more efficient outcome, offering high wages, and when 
experiencing low levels of effort, reverts to offering low wages. This is the only 
study, mentioned in this paper, which finds results not conforming to the predictions 
of the fair wage effort hypothesis.  
 To examine the objection that the stake sizes were to low, Fehr, Fischbacher, 
and Tougavera (2002) conducted an experiment, in Russia, in which session payouts 
of around three times the participants’ monthly incomes were made; the basic one 
sided oral auction design was used. Contrary to the critics’ objections, large stakes 
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led to outcomes similar to the other experiments, which contained relatively small 
stakes. Gift exchange still occurred, in sizeable amounts, despite the fact that the 
transactions were very costly to the participants. High stakes did not undermine the 
effect that fairness may have on the behaviour of participants (Fehr, Fischbacher, and 
Tougavera, 2002). 
 Uri Gneezy (2003) addressed the criticism that real effort provision would 
change the results; the previous experiments involved simply choosing a level of 
effort from a cost table. The workers were required to provide real effort in the form 
of solving mazes on a computer, though how much this may be real effort is 
debatable. The results of this experiment, a substantial positive relationship between 
wages and effort, are similar to other experiments. The choosing of a numerical effort 
level, instead of providing real effort, may therefore be a reasonable one. 
 Charness, Frechette, and Kagel (2004) conducted an investigation which 
examined the effect that including a payoff calculation table, as in Hannan, Kagel and 
Moser (2002), might have on the experiment. The inclusion of the table was found to 
reduce the average wages and average effort even more. The inclusion of a payoff 
table may therefore bias the results of the experiment upward and should be avoided 
in future experimentation. 
 The ability of the experimental design to address the objections made to its 
results, through modifications to the design, is a very advantageous feature of its 
construction. This allows for a number of criticisms to be discounted or proven 
sound, and have been, as in the above experiments. 
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2.5 Survey Investigations 
 
 Instead of conducting a laboratory experiment to study the relationship 
between wages and productivity, Bewley (1999) conducted a series of interviews 
with various managers and C.E.O.s in the northeastern United States. These 
interviews were conducted during the early 1990’s when the U.S. was in the middle 
of a recession. The main finding of Why Wages Don’t Fall In A Recession (Bewley, 
1999) is that the wage rigidity stems from a desire to encourage loyalty for the firm 
among the workers.  
 Bewley’s (1999) interviews uncover the beliefs that managers have about the 
importance of wages in productivity. Wages chiefly affect the morale of workers. 
Morale can be defined as “...emotional attitudes towards work, coworkers, and the 
organization.” (Bewley, 1999). If low wages are harmful to morale, and low morale 
harms productivity, then low wages will harm productivity. Of course the definition 
of low wages depends on the wages of those in the workers reference group and 
Bewley (1999) addresses this by questioning the managers as to the importance of 
internal and external wage equity. Internal wage equity is noted as very important by 
the managers, as it has a large effect on morale. External wage equity has a lesser 
effect on morale. Managers maintain that external wage equity is primarily important 
for its effects on turnover, recruitment and the quality of labour hired, it has little 
effect on morale. This may be explained by the high degree of firm specific jobs that 
make market comparisons difficult, labour unions and close knit communities may 
overcome this difference, but this extends to only a small fraction of the labour force 
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(Bewley, 1999).  
 Bewley’s (1999) findings are in line with the Fair Wage-Effort  
Hypothesis put forth by Akerlof (1982); higher wages exhibit a positive influence on 
productivity through their positive effect on morale. Internal and external equity, 
which are factors in the workers reference set and are used in evaluating the fairness 
of the wage, have the same effect as noted by Akerlof (1982), though external wage 
equity seems to play a far lesser role. 
 To examine the effects of differences in wages on workplace attitudes and 
behaviors Levine (1993) conducted a survey of over 8000 employees in nearly 100 
companies in the U.S. and Japan. Similar to the use of interviews by Bewley (1999), 
Levine (2003) used a survey composed of various questions regarding the workers 
happiness with their job and pay and their perceptions of the fairness of their 
situation.  
 The resulting data indicates that pay equity affects performance, absenteeism 
and turnover; also workers who receive high wages are less likely to quit, are more 
satisfied with their pay, and report that they work harder than they have to (Levine, 
2003). Like Bewley (1999), Levine (2003) finds that within organization comparisons 
are much more important that between firm comparisons.  
 Levine (2003) also examines whether the effect of a higher than average wage 
has the same effect as a lower than average wage. In other words, do overpaid 
workers experience the same level of discomfort that similarly underpaid workers do? 
In the U.S. data there is no evidence that this is true, virtually no Americans view 
themselves to be overpaid. In the surveys from Japan however, workers who are 
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highly paid compared to others in the plant appear to experience discomfort, they do 
enjoy being paid more than similar workers in other plants though. Levine (2003) 
notes that this conforms to the old Japanese saying; “the nail that stands out gets 
hammered down.” 
 These results of Bewley (1999) and Levine (2003) were achieved through the 
use of survey data, a method that is usually disparaged by experimental economists. 
The common complaint made about survey data is that the subjects may respond 
falsely to the questions asked of them if the answer allows the subject to present 
themselves in a more favorable light than their actual behaviour would present. For 
example, a subject may report that they work harder than they actually do since the 
culture views a hard work ethic as favorable. Another common complaint of survey 
data is that there are no incentives for the subjects to behave as they would in the real 
world. The monetary payment to the subjects, if one exists5, is not tied to their 
performance or decisions they make during the course of the experiment. Bewley 
(1999) suggests that the relation between circumstances and claimed motivation be 
examined to aid in controlling for this problem.  
It would be interesting to examine whether results similar to the experimental 
laboratory experiments mentioned above could be achieved using a survey format 
while remaining as close as possible to the initial experimental design developed by 
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl (2003).  
The size of the relationship between wages and effort estimated in the 
experiments is also an important. Is the relationship not only statistically significant 
but also economically significant? The size of the coefficients in the various 
                                                 
5 There may be a flat payout to subjects for completing the survey. 
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experiments seems to be large enough to be of some importance. If the coefficients 
were statistically significant but too small to make any noticeable impact on the 
economy they would be of no use. The relationships found previously indicate that 
this is not the case; the effect of wages on effort is large enough to be of interest. The 
relationship is strong enough that high wages need not lead to higher production costs 
for the firm; they are offset by increased productivity. The higher wages can lead to a 
situation in which there exists involuntary unemployment, which is not possible 
under neoclassical assumptions. Any policies formed under the assumption of only 
voluntary unemployment could therefore have detrimental effects on the economy 
and its population. 
 
The survey used in the investigation presented in this thesis attempts to 
examine this question of replication along with the addition of a few new or 
previously unimportant variables to the hypothetical labour market and remain 
comparable to the previous experimental investigations. These new variables include 
an unemployment benefit, knowledge of co-worker wages, high probability of 
detection of low effort provision, and individual subject characteristics. The details of 
the methodology of the survey and the motivation for the inclusion of the mentioned 
variables are given in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
  
  
The motivations for the investigation and the particular methods used to carry 
out the experiment are detailed in this chapter. Reasons for the inclusion of the 
examined variables and their importance to Akerlof’s (1982) Fair Wage-Effort 
Hypothesis are given. Descriptions of the variables and the predicted effects these 
variables may have are also noted with reference to the predictions of Akerlof’s 
(1982) theory and the results of previous experiments. 
 
3.1 Motivations 
 
The aim of this experiment is to examine the relationship that may exist 
between wages and effort when the structure of the underlying labour market 
changes. The changes that are examined are the addition of an unemployment benefit, 
the additional knowledge of co-worker wages, and the presence of close personal 
work supervision. Individual subject characteristics, such as gender and age, are also 
important variables in this investigation. These variables have not been included or 
found to be of significance in previous experiments. The experiment also attempts to 
examine these features using a survey or questionnaire format instead of the lab 
experiment used in previous investigations. 
 The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between 
wages and effort. The previous experiments, with the noted absence of Rigdon 
(2002), have all found a positive relationship to exist between wages and effort 
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choice. The main difference between this investigation and the others is the use of a 
survey instead of a lab experiment. 
The presence of an unemployment benefit has not been previously 
implemented in an experimental labour market. This may be to the possible 
complexity involved in constructing an easily understandable experiment involving 
an unemployment benefit. Unemployment benefits are a feature of the reference 
wage, as detailed in Akerlof (1982), and figure importantly into the employee’s 
evaluation of the degree of fairness the wage they currently receive; this then figures 
into the amount of effort they would chose to put forth. Receiving an unemployment 
benefit is an alternative to maintaining employment and the theory predicts an 
increase in unemployment benefits would erode the effort put forth by the employee. 
This prediction is refuted by Altman (2004b) for a number of reasons: there exists 
little empirical evidence for the negative effects of unemployment insurance; a 
number of the negative effects predicted stem from institutional features which do not 
exist or are limited in reality, for instance the availability of benefits for those 
voluntarily quit their jobs; and the availability of unemployment insurance reduces 
the costs of  searching  for an occupation to which the individual is a better fit, this 
increases employment length and productivity. This experiment does not allow for a 
change in the level of the unemployment benefit, only the additional presence of it. 
Co-worker wages are another essential component of the reference wage that 
is included in the investigation. The wages that other workers in the same firm 
receive are possibly the most important variable, outside of the employee’s own 
wage, considered in the formation of effort. They also are part of the reference wage 
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in presented by Akerlof (1982). Possible effects that the knowledge of co-worker 
wages may have on the level of effort choice have been investigated by Charness and 
Kuhn (2004). They found that the wages of co-workers have no significant effect on 
the effort choice of workers, though firms tend towards wage compression when 
these wages are public information. The effects of internal wage equity have also 
been examined by Bewley (1999) and Levine (1993) who note that internal wage 
inequity has negative effects on morale and productivity.  
The lack of consideration of co-worker wages in Charness and Kuhn (2004) 
may be due to the way they enter the firm’s payoff function; one worker contributed 
explicitly more to the firm’s payoff function than the other worker. The comparisons 
made in this experiment are with co-workers with similar work experience and 
education. A janitor is more likely to compare his pay with another janitor than with 
that of a manager.  
Close supervision of workers by managers is a variable that has not been 
included in other investigations. Rigdon (2002) found that the complete absence of 
supervision eroded the gift exchange environment and lead to the predictions of the 
narrow neoclassical model; minimum effort choice and wages. This experiment is 
concerned with the addition of close supervision of work by superiors. The close 
supervision variable is included in this survey as a high probability of detection when 
providing low effort. Ease of low effort detection may lead to an increase in effort 
provision. It may also lead to lower job acceptance level, as closely supervised work 
may be considered uncomfortable and undesirable by the subjects. This variable does 
not figure into Akerlof’s (1982) reference wage. 
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Individual subject characteristics, like gender and age, have not been a 
concern of previous experiments. When they are included in the investigation, as they 
are in Charness and Levine (2003), they are found to be statistically significant. The 
individual subject’s age, gender, place of origin, major of study, year of study and 
employment experience are examined for the possible effects they may have on the 
wage-effort relationship. While these variables are not included the Fair Wage-Effort 
Hypothesis, they are included in this investigation. 
The use of a survey instead of a lab experiment, to conduct the investigation, 
is another prominent difference between this and other experiments. Using surveys to 
investigate economic phenomenon may be discouraged by other investigators, like 
Friedman and Cassar (2004) or Friedmann and Sunder (1994), for numerous reasons 
including the absence of financial incentives tied to behaviour and possible false 
responses.  
This experiment allows the examination of whether the results of the previous 
experiments, a positive relationship between wages and effort, could be replicated in 
the absence of monetary incentives. Would subjects always respond with high effort 
choices when there is no cost to providing effort or possible future reward for doing 
so? 
The drawback of the use of a survey is that the analysis is restricted to the 
behaviour of workers. Effort responses to varying wages are given by the subjects. 
Other subjects playing the role of firms do not determine the wage offers; all subjects 
receive the same nine wage offers per market. The survey also excludes the time 
dimension that is present in lab experiments. The game examined in labs is a repeated 
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one; a survey does not allow for this. Therefore the analysis of convergence over 
time, as is often included in other lab experiments, is not possible. Despite these 
drawbacks the use of a survey is less expensive and simpler to implement than lab 
experiments.  
 
3.2 Survey Structure 
 
 The survey6 was constructed to be as close as possible to the lab experiments 
that have been previously conducted to investigate the fair wage-effort hypothesis, 
while keeping in mind the suggestions of Friedman and Cassar (2004) and Freidman 
and Sunder (1994) regarding experimental design. Under these suggestions the 
survey was kept as simple and short as possible and the subjects used were restricted 
to undergraduates. 
 The survey was designed in an attempt to remain close to the design of the 
simulated labour market designed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl (1993), while 
using a questionnaire format. The survey requires subjects to respond to a wage offer 
for a hypothetical job with a numerical response. It should be noted that the effort 
choice being measured is not real effort, it is simply a numerical choice noting the 
level of effort he subject indicates they would put forth in the situation. In this survey 
and the previous experiments, with the exception of Gneezy (2003), the effort choice 
is strictly hypothetical. The hypothetical job in question was one which the subject 
would expect to obtain upon completion of their degree.  
                                                 
6 See appendix one for the complete survey used in the investigation. 
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The numerical responses are defined in the following manner. A response of 
zero denoted a decline of the wage offer and a response between one and ten denoted 
an effort level. Table 2 presents the meaning and range of possible numerical 
responses to a wage offer. 
 
Table 2: Possible Response Choices  
 
              0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
(Decline the offer)           (very low effort………………………..very high effort) 
 
Wage offers extended from 6 to 22 dollars per hour, even numbers only. This 
presented nine wage offers per market, or 36 wage offers in total, for the respondent 
to consider. 
 The same nine wage offers were presented in four different markets. The first 
market was characterized by no unemployment insurance, no knowledge of what 
wages workers in similar positions with similar experience and education are 
receiving, and a small probability that you may be caught when providing low effort.  
The second market includes an unemployment benefit equivalent to receiving 
a 10$ per hour wage. This may seem to simple an abstraction from the unemployment 
benefit option available in the real world, but it presents a simple alternative to 
employment in the artificial labour market presented in the survey. An attempt to 
present a more realistic benefit may prove to confusing or difficult to implement.  
The third market includes knowledge of the wages of co-workers a similar 
position with similar experience and education receive. In the survey this was set at 
14$ per hour.  
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The fourth market includes a high probability of getting caught providing low 
effort, as opposed to the low probability present in the first market. This is an attempt 
to include a high degree of close supervision by managers into the survey labour 
market. A weakness present in this market is that the cost of being caught shirking is 
not addressed in the description of the market. Responses in this market may be 
dependant upon this cost; it is reasonable to assume that the punishment of being 
fired would have a larger effect than a lesser punishment such as a reprimand or pay 
reduction. This weakness could be easily addressed through a further refinement of 
the description of the fourth market regarding the cost of shirking. There also exists 
the issue of monitoring costs that the firm may incur for observing workers output, 
but this is an issue for studies examining firm behaviour and the focus here is on 
worker behaviour. 
A number of individual characteristics were also requested of the subjects. 
These include age, gender, place of origin, employment experience, major and year of 
study. The employment experience aspect of the survey also includes union and 
fulltime work experience, as opposed to only part time work experience. 
This structure enables the relationship between wages and effort choice to be 
examined along with the effects that unemployment insurance, knowledge of co-
worker wages, high probability of low effort detection and differing individual 
characteristics may have on this relationship. The first market may be considered as 
the base market with the other three markets presented one differing feature. 
Comparison of the second, third and fourth markets with the first will be the concern 
of the analysis. 
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The subject pool was restricted to undergraduates at the University of 
Saskatchewan. Undergraduates present a good choice for subjects because of easy 
access, low opportunity cost, steep learning curve, and that they seldom know much 
about your hypothesis (Freidman et.al., 1994, 2004). 
Once the survey structure was finalized an application for ethics approval was 
presented to the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board7 and 
approval with minor modifications was granted on October 25th 2005. The requested 
modifications were made and submitted the following week. 
 
 
3.3 Surveying Process and Recruitment 
 
To detect any possible problems with the survey a pilot session was conducted 
on November 28th. There was some confusion generated by the layout of the survey 
so minor layout modifications were made and the final survey was implemented over 
a number of days in February and March.  
Recruitment methods used included the placement of posters in various 
locations about the University of Saskatchewan and classroom announcements or 
poster distribution in the days preceding the experiment8. The poster placed around 
campus and the poster distributed among students was the same. Due to the lack of 
subjects obtained through these methods, no volunteers were generated by these 
methods on the first day of experimentation, other methods were necessary to gather 
                                                 
7 For complete application documents and approval certificate see appendix one. 
8 See appendix one for recruitment posters used. 
 44
subjects. 
Approaching potential subjects outside the classroom used for 
experimentation and asking if they wished to fill out a short survey was used as a 
method of recruitment on February 22nd and March 8th. If the potential subject 
desired more information about the survey the recruitment poster was shown to them 
and any questions regarding the survey were answered.  
Classroom visits were also used to generate completed surveys. The following 
Economics classes were visited: Economics 417 on February 22nd; Economics 214 on 
February27th; and Economics 227 on February 28th.   
All experiments were conducted between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 1:30 
p.m. in order to control for possible time of day effects. The classrooms were all 
located in the Arts building classroom wing and had similar layouts and seating. In 
total these methods yielded 83 completed surveys, four had to be discarded due to 
incorrect completion. No monetary payment was given to any of the subjects for their 
participation. 
All sessions were conducted in the same manner. Participants were given a 
consent form and survey form which they were asked to read over carefully and 
complete. It was also made clear that clarifying questions were acceptable. 
Participants were provided with a pen if they had none. Consent forms and surveys 
were stored separately and not examined until after the session was completed, as to 
ensure anonymity. 
 
3.4 Sample Size Selection 
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 When sampling it is necessary to determine an optimal sample size given your 
choice of the level of significance and the maximum allowable difference between 
the population and the sample means. This is done to restrict the possible sampling 
error that may occur. To compute the optimal sample size I have used a formula 
given in Desu and Raghavarao (1999) derived from the binomial distribution9. This 
reflects the binomial nature of the response to the various wage offers presented in 
the survey; subjects respond to a wage offer with a choice of accept or decline. 
 
Optimal Sample Size Formula 
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Using the above formula and opting for a level of significance of 0.05 and a 
maximum allowable difference of 0.1 the optimal sample size is 97. Due to the 
difficulty in finding subjects for the survey a compromise was made in the choice of 
the level of significance. The level of significance was now taken to be 0.1; the 
maximum allowable difference was the same. This new level of significance 
                                                 
9 Optimal sample size was also calculated using a formula given in Desu and Raghavarao (1999) 
derived from the normal distribution. This was done to incorporate the possible range of responses to 
the wage offers presented in the survey; beyond a choice of accept or decline, the subjects also choose 
a level of effort in the event they accept the wage offer. The optimal sample size calculated in this 
manner was less restrictive than the one used above. 
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generates an optimal sample size of 69. The sample obtained in the implementation of 
the surveys yielded 83 respondents. This exceeds the restriction on optimal sample 
size and therefore satisfies the conditions it puts forth. 
Other studies have used sample sizes ranging from 58, in Fehr, Kirchsteiger 
and Reidl (1998), to 306, in Brandts and Charness (2004). The sample size of 83 used 
in this thesis is in the lower range of the previous experiments, but satisfies the 
conditions set forth by the formula above. It may be taken as a reasonable sample size 
given the degree of sampling error specified in the formula. 
It should also be noted that this sample was not generated using probabilistic 
sampling and the results should therefore not be taken as representative of the entire 
population. This weakness is also present in all the previous experimental studies 
which used student populations as their sampling group; this study and the others all 
face possible external validity issues. At worst this survey and the other experiments 
could be taken as case studies. An advantage of the design of this survey and the lab 
experiments it was derived from is it could easily address these questions of external 
validity through replications with other more representative populations. There is 
nothing in the design that precludes the use of other populations.  
 
 
 
3.5 Model and Descriptions/Predictions of Variables 
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 This section presents the model used to examine the relationship between 
wages and effort along with the other variable included in the survey and subsequent 
analysis. A description of the variables is then given. This is followed by a listing of 
the reasons for their inclusion and the possible effects they may have on the wage 
effort relationship. 
3.5.1 The Model 
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 The variables used in this functional form are specified and defined in Table 3 
presented below. 
Table 3: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
EFFORT Effort level choice: range 0-10 (dependant variable) 
ACCEPT Dummy variable for effort (Decline = 0; Accept = 1) 
(dependant variable) 
WAGE The wage offer presented to the subject: range 6-22, even 
numbers 
AGE Age of the subject 
FEMALE Dummy variable for gender (Male = 0; Female = 1) 
OUTOFPROV Dummy variable for place of origin (In province = 0; Outside 
of province = 1; Outside of Canada = 0) 
OUTOFCANADA Dummy variable for place of origin (In province = 0; Outside 
of province = 0; Outside of Canada=1) 
NONECONMAJOR Dummy variable for area of study (Economics = 0; Other = 
1) 
YEAROFSTUDY Subjects year of study: range 1-4 
EMPLOYMENTEXP Dummy variable for employment experience (No previous 
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employment = 0; previous employment = 1) 
UNIONEXP Dummy variable for union experience (No previous union 
employment = 0; previous employment with unions = 1) 
FULLTIME Dummy variable for fulltime employment (Part time 
employment only = 0; fulltime employment = 1) 
EIOPTION Dummy variable for observation’s market location 
(Observation from market one = 0; observation from market 
two = 1; observation from market three = 0; observation from 
market four = 0) further defined as EILOWEROREQUAL (if 
wage offer is equal to or lower than 10 then =1, 0 otherwise) 
and EIHIGHER (if wage offer is higher than 10 then=1, 0 
otherwise). 
COWORKERWAGE Dummy variable for observation’s market location 
(Observation from market one = 0; observation from market 
two = 0; observation from market three = 1; observation from 
market four = 0) further defined as WAGELOWER ( if wage 
offer is lower than 14 then=1, 0 otherwise), WAGEEQUAL 
(if wage offer is 14 then=1, 0 otherwise) and 
WAGEHIGHER (if wage offer is larger than 14 then=1, 0 
otherwise). 
SUPERVISION Dummy variable for observation’s market location 
(Observation from market one = 0; observation from market 
two = 0; observation from market three = 0; observation from 
market four = 1) 
 
3.5.2 The Base Group 
 The dummy variables define the base group as observations located in market 
one made by male subjects from Saskatchewan, majoring in economics, with no 
previous employment experience. The dummy variables, with the exception of 
EMPLOYMENTEXP, were chosen to reflect the personal characteristics that occur 
with the highest frequency. EMPLOYMENTEXP was defined as it is because the 
effect of previous employment on effort provision is the variable under consideration, 
not the effect on effort of no previous employment experience. The market dummy 
variables were defined as they are, with market one as the base market, because the 
relevant comparisons to be made are those between the first market and the other 
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three. Market one is marked by the absence of the three features that the other three 
markets each add separately. Comparisons made between the second to fourth 
markets would not make sense. 
3.5.3 Descriptions and Predictions 
 The points that follow present descriptions of the variables and predictions 
made as to their effects on the dependant variable, effort, and the relationship 
between wage and effort. 
? EFFORT is the dependant variable in the model. It is the effort level that the 
subject decides to choose, not real effort, when offered a particular wage. The 
possible choices range from 0 to 10; with 0 indicating a decline of the wage 
offer and 1 to 10 representing increasing effort.  
? ACCEPT is another way of representing the dependant variable EFFORT. It 
is a dummy variable taking on the value 0 if the subject declines the job, effort 
choice of zero, and 1 if the subject accepts the job, effort choices of 1 through 
10. This variable is defined to reflect the possible two stage choice made 
when considering a wage offer. First the subject decides whether or not to 
accept the job and second they decide on a level of effort to provide.  
? WAGE denotes the wage offer that the subject considers when making their 
effort choice and is a continuous variable. It ranges from 6 to 22, even 
numbers only. This range was chosen to keep the survey understandable and 
to reflect the possible range of earnings that a typical undergraduate may 
expect upon graduation. The relationship between wages and effort in 
Akerlof’s (1982) theory is a positive one and previous experimental studies 
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have found this relationship to be valid. The same relationship is expected to 
be found here, as stated in hypothesis A. In addition to this positive 
relationship, the square of the variable WAGE is expected to have a negative 
coefficient; the wage effort relationship is expected to be concave. 
? AGE is the age of the subject and is a continuous variable. No previous 
studies have explicitly included the age of the subjects, Hannan et.al. (2002) 
may have captured some age differences when examining different subject 
pools that would expectedly have different ages; undergraduates and M.B.A. 
students. AGE is expected to have a small positive coefficient. This is 
predicted because as a subject ages they may gain more experience as to how 
in the labour market higher effort may be rewarded by higher wages. 
? FEMALE is a dummy variable denoting the gender of the subject. In 
previous studies the gender of the participants has not been included in the 
analysis, with the exception of Charness and Levine (2003), who found the 
female dummy variable to have a small, negative and statistically insignificant 
effect. The fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) has no predictions 
pertaining to gender. The variable was included in the analysis to control for 
some of the differences in subject population and to investigate a possible 
effect on the wage effort relationship that has mostly been left out of previous 
studies. A study conducted by Eckel and Grossman (1998) found women to 
behave less selfishly in dictator games than men. Contrary to the results of the 
dictator game findings, no statistically significant coefficient is predicted for 
this variable. 
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? OUTOFPROV is a dummy variable representing the subject’s place of 
origin. It is used to examine the possible effect that cultural differences may 
have on the effort wage relationship. Different cultures may have differing 
attitudes towards work and different countries may have labour markets that 
operate differently. Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougavera (2002) compared the 
results of an experiment using Russian subjects to one using Austrian 
subjects. They found no statistical difference in the behaviour of the two 
subject pools. The fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) makes no 
predictions as to the effect of place of origin. No statistically significant effect 
is predicted for this variable due to the predictions of the theory and the 
results of previous studies. 
? OUTOFCANADA is another dummy variable used to represent place of 
origin. Similar to the OUTOFPROV variable no statistically significant effect 
is expected based on cultural differences. A possible source of difference, 
outside of a cultural one, may be expected due to subject’s native language 
differences and difficulty in understanding the questions asked of them in the 
survey. No statistically significant effect is expected for this variable for the 
same reasons mentioned in the discussion of the OUTOFPROV variable. 
? NONECONMAJ is a dummy variable used to include the effects that a 
subjects educational background might have on the wage effort relationship. It 
takes the value 0 if the subject is majoring in economics; this includes 
business and agricultural economics. Educational background has previously 
been examined in a study conducted by Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002). 
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They found that M.B.A. students provide a higher level of effort in the 
experiment than undergraduate students, in the experiment presented in this 
thesis all the subjects are undergraduates. This variable was included to 
account for possible exposure to efficiency wage theory. Subjects who have 
knowledge of the theory under examination may unconsciously or 
consciously record answers conforming to what they know the theory 
predicts. In this case they might provide higher levels of effort for a given 
wage than a subject who has no knowledge of the fair wage-effort hypothesis. 
Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) have investigated whether the study of 
economics reduces cooperation in laboratory games. Does the study of theory 
which models economic actors as selfish induce that behaviour in laboratory 
subjects? Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) have found that it does tend to 
reduce the level of cooperation. For this reason a positive coefficient is 
expected for this variable. 
? YEAROFSTUDY is a continuous variable taking the values 1 to 4. This 
variable has not been included in previous studies which use undergraduates 
as subjects. A small negative coefficient is expected. As a student progresses 
through their educational program they may develop a more concrete 
expectation of what kind of wage they may expect to find in the job market. 
This would then lead them to expect a higher wage for a given level of effort, 
resulting in a negative coefficient on the YEAROFSTUDY variable. 
? EMPLOYMENTEXP is a dummy variable capturing the employment 
experience of the subject in question. This variable has not been under 
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examination in any previous studies nor is it mentioned in the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982). It is expected to have a small positive coefficient. 
A subject with workplace experience has a better understanding of how the 
workplace operates and how effort may be rewarded with higher wages. This 
is the same reason given for the prediction of a small positive coefficient on 
AGE. 
? UNIONEXP is a dummy variable noting whether or not the subject has had 
experience in a union job. No previous studies have included this variable nor 
does the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) include it. It is predicted 
to have a small negative coefficient. Union employees usually have more 
effective and rigid procedures for complaints related to the workplace than 
non union employees do. Rules related to punishing employees for shirking 
are specified and common knowledge; they cannot be dismissed as easily as 
non union employees. Union employees may therefore provide lower effort 
for a given wage than a non union employee, as they have knowledge the 
exact consequences of their actions. In order to avoid a prediction in which 
the individual has no employment experience and union experience, an 
impossible combination, the variable is entered into the regression as 
UNIONEXP*EMPLOYMENTEXP; this will negate that situations possible 
existence. 
? FULLTIME is a dummy variable relating whether or not the subject has had 
fulltime employment. It has not been included in any previous studies and is 
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not included in the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982). No 
statistically significant effect is expected for this variable. 
? EIOPTION is a dummy variable used to capture the possible difference that 
may occur between market one, the base market, and market two, the market 
with the unemployment benefit feature. No previous studies have included 
this variable. In order to account for the possible different effects of wage 
offers being above or below the benefit the dummy variable is separated into 
two dummy variables; EILOWEROREQUAL, for wage offers lower than or 
equal to the benefit, and EIHIGHER, for wage offers higher than the benefit. 
It is part of the fair wage conception in the fair wage-effort hypothesis 
(Akerlof, 1982). Increasing the level of unemployment benefits available 
raises the wage the employee considers fair and lowers the effort level an 
employee puts forth holding their wage constant. It is therefore predicted to 
have a negative coefficient. This is the prediction of hypothesis B. 
? COWORKERWAGE is a dummy variable used to examine the differences 
that may occur between market one, the base market, and market three, the 
market which includes knowledge of coworker wages. This has been included 
in a previous experiment conducted by Charness and Kuhn (2004). In their 
study no statistically significant effect was found. In order to examine the 
possible effect of wages offers being above, equal or lower than the co-worker 
wage, the market dummy was separated into three dummies: WAGEHIGHER 
for wage offers above the co-worker wage; WAGEEQUAL for wage offers 
equal to the co-worker wage; and WAGELOWER for wage offers below the 
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co-worker wage. Wage inequity in the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 
1982) has a negative effect on the effort an employee provides for a given 
wage. Even though no significant effect was found in a previous study, a 
negative effect is expected in this thesis. This is the prediction of hypothesis 
C. 
? SUPERVISION is a dummy variable used to compare market four, the 
market with a high probability of being caught providing low effort, with 
market one, the base market. It has been examined previously by Rigdon 
(2002) who found that, in the absence of supervision, wages and effort 
reverted to the neoclassical predictions of the lowest effort levels and wages 
possible in the experiment. The level of supervision is not part of the fair 
wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982). In this study it is predicted to have a 
small positive coefficient. Facing a high probability of being caught providing 
low effort the employee may increase the level of effort for a given wage 
relative to facing a low probability. This is the prediction of hypothesis D. 
 
These predictions are compared to the actual results of the survey in the next 
chapter, which examines the data using descriptive statistics and econometric 
analysis. Attention is paid as to whether or not the survey data conforms to the 
fair wage-effort hypothesis and the predictions made above; this includes the 
Hypotheses outlined in the introduction. 
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 Chapter Four: Results 
 This chapter presents a summary and analysis of the results of the survey. The 
first section is devoted to descriptive statistics and interpretations of the results. This 
includes statistics which describe the features of the sample used and an investigation 
into the differences between the four markets. 
The second section is an econometric analysis of the data. This analysis is 
separated into two subsections: the first pools all the data into one market, with 
dummy variables to capture market differences; the second groups and analyzes the 
data in separate markets. In this section the two econometric models used to examine 
the data, the ordinary OLS model and the conditional model, will be described and 
their results interpreted. Attention will be paid to the size of the coefficients in 
addition to their statistical significance. The elasticity of effort with respect to wages 
and its conformity to the Solow (1979) condition is also examined. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
4.1.1 Description of the Sample 
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 To examine the composition of the sample used in this investigation the 
means, modes and standard deviations of the variables were calculated. These 
statistics are presented in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Mean
 
Mode
 
S.D. 
 
EFFORT 5.193775 6
 
3.678801 
ACCEPT 0.770080 1 0.420851 
WAGE 14.000000 14 5.164842 
AGE 22.975900 22 3.318909 
FEMALE 0.373494 0 0.483813 
OUTOFPROV 0.144578 0 0.351734 
OUTOFCANADA 0.289157 0 0.453447 
NONECONMAJOR 0.530120 1 0.499175 
YEAROFSTUDY 2.831325 3 0.916133 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.795515 1 0.403392 
UNIONEXP 0.240964 0 0.427740 
FULLTIME 0.469880 0 0.499175 
EIOPTION 0.250000 0 0.433085 
COWORKERWAGE 0.250000 0 0.433085 
SUPERVISION 
 
0.250000 0 0.433085 
 
 From Table 4 it can be seen that the means of the dummy variables, with the 
exception of NONECONMAJOR and EMPLOYMENTEXP, are all less than 0.5. 
This shows that the base group chosen represents the most common occurring 
subject. The variables NONECONMAJOR and EMPLOYMENTEXP were chosen in 
the manner they are so that their coefficients could be interpreted as the effect of their 
presence, in contrast to the effect of their absence. The means of the dummy variables 
used to capture individual subject characteristics show the percentage of the sample 
which contains that characteristic. For example, he mean of FEMALE shows that 
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37.3494% of the subjects used were women and the mean of NONECONMAJOR 
shows that 53.012% of the subjects had majors other than economics. 
 The dummy variables EIOPTION, COWORKERWAGE and SUPERVISION 
all have a mean of 0.25. This demonstrates that every market has the same number of 
observations; in the survey all subjects were exposed to each market and each market 
had the same number of wage offers. 
 The continuous independent variables WAGE, AGE and YEAROFSTUDY 
have means of 14, 22.9759 and 2.831325. The mean of AGE is in the range of typical 
undergraduate ages, possibly towards the higher end of undergraduate ages. The 
YEAROFSTUDY mean illustrates that the sample used is made up proportionally 
more upper year undergraduates. It is higher than 2.5 which is the middle value of the 
possible range of values which YEAROFSTUDY contains. The mean of wage does 
not have much of an interpretation here; it is constructed artificially to be used in the 
survey. 
 These descriptive statistics illustrate the structure of the sample that the 
experiment used. More interesting statistics involve the responses to the wage offers 
that the survey generated. These are examined in the following sections. 
 
4.1.2 Graphical Analysis  
 This subsection deals with the effort responses to the wage offers the survey 
presented to the subjects. An initial investigation into the wage-effort relationship, 
and the effect that the four markets have on the relationship, is conducted by plotting 
the frequencies of the various possible effort-wage pairings and examining the 
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resulting graphs. These frequencies are presented in Graph 1 below. Observations are 
separated into the four markets used in the survey. 
 
Graph 1: Frequencies of Effort-Wage Pairings 
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 The most immediately recognizable feature of the resulting graphs is positive 
wage-effort relationship in all four markets. A visual line drawn through the scatter of 
the observations has a positive slope, though there is much variation around this line. 
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In order to properly examine these graphs attention must be paid to the size of the 
bubbles.  
The size of the bubbles notes the frequency of that effort-wage pairing; a 
larger size notes a higher frequency. The size of the frequency bubbles reveals more 
about the relationship than a simple scatter plot does. The bubbles still illustrate a 
positive relationship, but they additionally show a concentration of observations near 
the pairings of (0,6) and (10,22). This concentration occurs in all four markets. This 
may occur because of the structure of the survey; wage offers range from 6 to 22 and 
effort responses range from 0 to 10. This demonstrates that subjects are more 
undivided in their responses at the corners of the possible pairings than they are in the 
middle. Though there remains a positive visual relationship, the size of the bubbles is 
smaller and more spread out in-between the corners. In other words subjects have 
more common responses at extremes than between these extremes. The spread of the 
responses increases between the two corner pairings. This illustrates that subjects 
have less in common in their choices between the corners. Firms offering wages at 
the low and high ends of the wage spread can be surer of the level of effort they can 
expect workers to input. Wages offered in the middle range have a larger range of 
corresponding effort values, firms can not be as sure of the level of reciprocation they 
can expect for a wage increase in the middle range. Firms desiring a high level of 
effort input may have to offer wages at the high end of the range to ensure a 
corresponding high effort level. If firms a very risk averse this may lead to high and 
low wage sectors of the economy, with firms sorting themselves into either sector 
depending on whether they require high or low effort inputs. 
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The concentration at (0,6) may also follow from the wage offer of 6 being 
below the minimum wage in Saskatchewan and the rest of Canada. The occurrence of 
some acceptances at the wage offer of six may reflect a lack of knowledge of the 
labour market or differences in the labour markets of Canada and foreign countries; 
28.9157% of the subjects come from outside of Canada 
In examining the differences and similarities that exist between the four 
markets the most prominent similarity is a positive wage-effort relationship. The four 
markets all exhibit increasing effort responses when increasing the wage offers. This 
is in line with the predictions of Akerlof’s (1982) model and Hypothesis A. Previous 
experiments have also found a positive wage-effort relationship, with the exception of 
Rigdon (2002). 
The differences between markets may be seen in the size of the bubbles. The 
bubbles in all four markets are similar at the upper right corner, but differ in the lower 
left corner. Market two has more persistently large bubbles along the 0 effort line 
than market one. The bubbles stay reasonably large until a wage of 12, as opposed to 
market one where they stay large until a wage of 10. For example, it is more common 
to decline a wage offer of 10 in market two than in market one. This is due to the 
possibility of an unemployment benefit, equivalent to a wage of 10, in market two. 
Market three also has more persistently large bubbles along the 0 effort line than 
market one. The bubbles in market three stay reasonably large until a wage offer of 
14. For example, it is more common to decline a wage offer of 12 in market three 
than in market one. This is due to the knowledge of coworker wages present in 
market three; the subject knows that similar workers are being paid a wage of 14. 
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This is opposed to market one, where the subject has no knowledge of coworker 
wages. Wage offers in market three made below 14 are deemed unfair by the subject 
and declined. The differences found between markets one and markets two and three 
conform to the predictions of the Akerlof’s (1982) model and Hypotheses B and C. In 
contrast to the findings presented here the previous experiment regarding coworker 
wages (Charness and Kuhn, 2004) found coworker wages to have no effect on the 
wage-effort relationship. Markets one and two have no discernable visual differences; 
this is in opposition to Hypothesis D which predicts a positive effect on the 
relationship when compared to market one. 
A more revealing analysis may be conducted by examining the effort means 
conditional on the wage offers. This is presented in the next subsection. 
 
4.1.3 Effort Response Means Conditional on Wage Offers 
The effort response means conditional on the wage offers are presented in 
Graph 2 below. The means are also separated according to the market they are 
derived from. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Conditional Means 
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The frequency graphs presented in the previous subsection reveal a positive 
wage-effort relationship, the same is found when examining the conditional effort 
means. In all four markets the mean of effort increases with the wage offer made. For 
example, in market one the mean of effort increases from 2.36146 to 3.975904 as the 
wage offer increases from 8 to 10. This conforms to the predictions of the fair wage-
effort hypothesis and Hypothesis A.  
The means in market two are slightly below those in market one up to the 
wage offer of 14, after which they are similar to those in market one. The means in 
market three are further below the means in market one up to the wage offer of 16, 
after which they are similar to those in market one. The similarity that exists after the 
co-worker wage shows that being paid more than co-worker wages has no effect on 
effort. This is in line with the findings of Levine (1993) regarding U.S. workers; 
wage inequality only affects effort when the worker under examination is paid less 
than similar workers and not when they are paid more. These results are explained 
with the same reasoning used to explain the differences between market one and 
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markets two and three found in the frequency graphs. The means in market two are 
lower up to the wage offer of 14 because the subjects have an option of receiving an 
unemployment benefit of equivalent to a wage of 10. The means in market three are 
lower up to the wage offer of 16 because they have knowledge that similar workers 
are paid a wage of 14. This corresponds to the predictions of the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis and Hypotheses B and C. The lower means in market three are differ from 
the lack of effect of co-worker wages on the wage-effort relationship found in 
Charness and Kuhn (2004). Like the frequency graphs there is no noticeable 
difference between markets one and four; this is in conflict to Hypothesis D. 
Aside from visual inspection of the conditional means it is useful to conduct a 
statistical test to examine the differences between the markets. Two sample T-tests10 
conducted under the null hypothesis of equal means and a level of significance of 
0.05 are presented in Table 5 
Table 5: Two Sample T-Tests11
 
Wage Offer 
 
Market Two 
 
Market Three 
 
Market Four 
 
6 0.671039 0.988273 -0.667939
8 2.043007* 3.374809* 0.806931
10 3.348689* 4.287651* 1.283817
12 1.832331 5.504902* 0.502446
14 0.643869 1.708969 -0.112459
16 1.345562 0.431338 -0.432616
18 1.630200 0.376255 -0.423118
20 1.204463 0.370307 0.655419
22 
 
1.545642 0.135938 0.421388
 
                                                 
10 For formula see Harnett and Murphy (2000, page 415). 
11 * denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis at a level of significance equal to 0.05 
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The only significant differences in the means between market one and the 
other markets occurs at the wage offers of 8 and 10 in market two and the wage offers 
of 8, 10 and 12 in market three. There are no significant differences in the means 
between markets one and four. The lack of significant differences between markets 
one and four is in opposition to Hypothesis D. 
 The differences between markets one and two occur because of the 
unemployment benefit. With the exception of the lowest wage offer of 6, if the 
subject faces a wage offer equal to or lower than the unemployment benefit, the mean 
effort is significantly lower than the mean effort in the absence of the unemployment 
benefit. This conforms to the predictions of the fair wage-effort hypothesis and 
Hypothesis B. The significant differences between markets one and three occur 
because of the knowledge of co-worker wages; similar co-workers receive a wage of 
14. With the exception of the lowest wage offer of 6, if the subject faces a wage lower 
than that which similar co-workers receive, the mean effort is significantly lower than 
in the absence of the knowledge of co-worker wages. This is in line with the 
predictions of the fair wage-effort hypothesis and Hypothesis C. The findings of 
Charness and Kuhn (2004) regarding co-worker wages, co-worker wages have no 
significant effect on effort, are not reproduced here. The lack of significant 
differences at and above the co-worker wage of 14 demonstrates that paying workers 
equal to or more than similar coworkers will have no effect on wages; where paying 
less has a significant negative effect on effort. This is similar to the findings of 
Levine (1993) regarding U.S. workers. 
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The lack of significant differences in the effort means at the wage offer of 6, 
in contrast to the differences that occur at higher wages in markets two and three, 
further illustrates the effect that the range of wage offers given. This is mentioned in 
the analysis of the frequency graphs. It should also be noted that a wage of 6 is below 
the minimum wage in Saskatchewan; a wage offer of 6 is illegal so no one should 
accept it. The observation of some acceptances at this wage offer may reflect a lack 
of knowledge regarding the labour market or possible differences between the 
Canadian and foreign labour markets; 28.9157% of the subjects come from outside of 
Canada. 
In summary the conditional effort means correspond to the predictions of the 
fair wage-effort hypothesis and Hypotheses A, B and C while refuting the predictions 
of Hypothesis D.  
4.1.4 Effort Modes Conditional on Wage Offers 
Due to the ordinal nature of the effort response choices a possible better 
measure than the mean of effort may be the mode. While the mean allows for any 
value in the range of effort responses, including any division between the values; the 
mode only allows for whole values. This reflects the limited choices offered to the 
subjects; they may only choose the whole numbers, representing effort, offered to 
them, not any possible number in the range of values.  
Examining the mode of effort also allows the persistence of wage offer 
declines at the lower wages to be observed. The choice of zero in the lower range of 
wage offers is visually evident in the mode graph; in the mean graph it is less 
apparent. The effort mode conditional on the wage offer is presented in Graph 3 
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below. The modes are separated into the four markets to enable comparisons between 
markets. 
 
Graph 3: Conditional Modes 
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 Graph 3 reveals implications similar to those made using the mean of effort 
for analysis. The mode of effort is increasing in wage, conforming to the fair wage-
effort hypothesis and Hypothesis A. What are not as easily noticeable are differences 
between the markets. Markets one and four again seem to exhibit no noticeable 
differences; market four does seem more erratic though. Different than the 
conclusions reached in the examination, are the similarities of markets one and two. 
While an examination of the means revealed significant differences between markets 
one and two, an examination of the modes reveals no differences; the only exception 
being the dip occurring at the wage offer of 14 in market two. The mode of 0 persists 
for longer in market three than in the other markets; in the other markets it occurs 
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until a wage offer of 10, in market three until a wage offer of 12. This reflects the 
effect that a co-worker wage of 14 has on the subject’s effort choice.  
The visual differences present in the modes conforms to the predictions of the 
fair wage-effort hypothesis, with the exception of the effect of unemployment 
benefits, and Hypotheses A and C, while opposing Hypotheses B and C. 
 
4.1.5 Standard Deviations Conditional on Wage Offers 
 As can be seen in the frequency plots the spread of the effort responses 
is larger in the middle of the range of wage offers than at the extremes of the wage 
offers. Are more formal analysis of this spread can be seen in the standard deviations 
of effort responses conditional on the wage offers. Graph 4 illustrates these 
conditional standard deviations.  
 
Graph 4: Conditional Standard Deviations 
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Graph 3 further demonstrates than subjects have less common responses at 
middle wages than at the extreme wage offers; this occurs in all four markets. This is 
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due to the effect of the range of wage offers and effort choices mentioned in the 
frequency graph analysis. The importance of the shape of these standard deviation 
curves is the same as the reasons given for the clustering of the effort-wage pairings 
in the bubble graph previously examined. Firms can be surer of the effect of wages on 
effort at the low and high end of the wage offer range. This may result in two 
different sectors: one with high wages and effort; and one with low wages and effort. 
 
4.1.6 Accept/Decline Percentages 
In Graph 5, presented below, the percentage of accepts and declines 
conditional on wage offers is given for the four markets. This is done to examine the 
effects that wages and the market differences may have on the second dependant 
variable used, ACCEPT. 
 
Graph 5: Accept Decline Percentages 
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The graph of accept percentages reveals that increasing the wage offer 
increases the percentage of the subject accepting the job, for all four markets. This is 
in line with the predictions of the fair wage-effort hypothesis and Hypothesis A. At 
the lower wage offers there exist differences between the markets, high wage offers 
erase these differences. This follows from the features that the four markets possess. 
 In market two there exists accept percentage differences from market one 
until the wage offer of 12, after which they are similar. This follows from the 
unemployment benefit, equivalent to a wage of 10, available in market two. When 
presented with an alternative to not working equal to a wage of 10, the subject 
declines the wage offer in favour of not working and collecting the unemployment 
benefit. This conforms to the predictions of the fair wage-effort hypothesis and 
Hypothesis B. In market three these differences persist until a wage offer of 12. This 
follows from the knowledge that similar co-workers earn a wage of 14; wage offers 
made below 14 are considered unfair and are more likely to be declined than in the 
absence of the knowledge of co-worker wages. This is different than the findings of 
Charness and Kuhn (2004), who find no effect for co-worker wages. Wage offers 
equal to or above the co-worker wage of 14 have no noticeable effect on the accept 
percentage of the subject, similar to the findings of Levine (1993) for U.S. workers. 
These conclusions are in line with the predictions of the fair wage-effort hypothesis 
and Hypothesis C.  
The graph also reveals differences in accept percentages between markets one 
and four at the lower wages; analyzing previous statistics revealed no differences 
between these markets. For a given wage in the range of 8 to 12, the accept 
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percentage in market four is noticeably lower than in market one. While the high 
probability of being caught providing low effort in market four may have no effect on 
the provision of effort, it may have an affect on the decision to accept or decline the 
offer. The lower accept percentage in market four indicates that workers may have to 
be compensated for the high degree of supervision with a higher wage. These 
differences disappear in the higher range of wage offers, in which the wage may be 
suitably high enough to compensate for the uncomfortable working conditions. 
An interesting result of the survey that is observable here is the relatively 
large amount of accepts that occur at the wage offer of 6, which is below the 
minimum wage. On e explanation for this may be the lack of knowledge of the labour 
market possessed by the survey subjects. Out of the 74 accepts present at the wage of 
six , 54 had no employment experience. That is 73% of the accepts at the wage offer 
of 6 have no employment experience and therefore may have no knowledge of the 
labour market characteristics they may face in the real world. Another possible 
explanation is that the subjects may feel that they have no choice in the theoretical 
framework presented here. In this artificial labour market no mention was made of 
the existence of a minimum wage and the subjects may have thought it not to exist, as 
other features of the labour market were explicitly defined. This explanation cannot 
be as easily examined as the latter.  
There also exist a high number of acceptances in the second market, the 
market with unemployment benefits, at wage offers equal to and lower than the 
benefits the subjects would be entitled to in the absence of accepting the offer.  
 73
In market two, 86 of the 249 wage offers of ten and below were accepted or 34.54%. 
Unlike the explanation of lack of employment experience that may explain the 
acceptance of wage offers below the minimum wage, there exists no such easily 
illustrated explanation here. One theoretical explanation is that in the real world 
receiving unemployment benefits may carry some social stigma and this may carry 
over into the decisions made in the artificial world of this survey, therefore people 
may still accept wage offers even though they may receive a larger or equal amount 
when collecting the benefit. 
 
 
To summarise the findings of the descriptive statistics, the results of the 
survey seem to lend credence to the fair wage-effort hypothesis and the validity of 
Hypotheses A, B and C. They do not, however, provide any support for Hypothesis 
D, with the exception of the degree of supervision’s effect on the decision to accept 
or decline the wage offer. A more enlightening analysis of the survey results is 
conducted in the next section, which conducts an econometric investigation of the 
data. 
 
4.2 Econometric Analysis 
 
This section details the regressions used to analysis the survey data and 
discusses the implications of their results. It is divided into two subsections: the first 
deals with the pooled data; the second with the data separated into the four markets. 
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All regression were estimated using the EVIEWS 3.1 package with the exception of 
the marginal effects, which were calculated using PCGIVE and GIVEWIN. 
 
4.2.1 Pooled Markets 
Two different econometric models, involving a total of three regressions, are 
used to inspect the data. The first model is a simple OLS regression using EFFORT 
as the dependant variable and the remaining variables as the independent variables; a 
square of the WAGE variable, WAGE^2.  
The second model is referred to as the conditional model and involves two 
separate regressions. This model reflects the two stage decision that the subjects make 
when faced with a wage offer. They first decide whether or not to accept the offer and 
then they decide what level of effort to put forth. The model is referred to as the 
conditional model because, making an effort level choice is conditional on accepting 
the wage offer. This model uses two regressions to examine this two stage decision 
making process. The first regression is binary choice Probit model with ACCEPT, a 
dummy variable with decline=0 and accept=1, as the dependant variable. All the 
other variables with a squared WAGE variable, WAGE^2, are included as 
independent variables. The second regression is a simple OLS regression like in the 
first model, but with the zeros not included12. The zeros are discarded from this 
regression because the represent declining the wage offer and this decision is already 
included in the first regression.  
The square of the wage variable, WAGE^2, is included to test for a possible 
non-linear relationship between wages and effort. This relationship is often present in 
                                                 
12 There is a question of possible sample selection bias from excluding the zeros that is ignored here 
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efficiency wage literature, including Akerlof’s (1982) model, and it is useful to 
examine whether or not this theoretical relationship is present in the experimental 
data. 
Initial estimation of these regressions showed presence of 
heteroscedasticity13, this was expected to be a problem because of the changing 
variances as wage increased, see Graph 3. In order to correct for the problems this 
presents in making accurate decisions about the statistical significance of the 
variables in the regression, White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and 
Covariances14 were used in the OLS regressions and Huber\White Standard Errors 
and Covariances were used in the Probit regressions.  
The results of the two models and three regressions are summarized in Table 6 
below. Table 6 also includes: the adjusted R^2 for the OLS regressions and the 
McFadden R^2 for the Probit regression; the number of observations included in the 
regressions; the F-statistic for the OLS regression and the LR statistic for the Probit 
regression, testing whether the independent variables are jointly statistically 
insignificant; and, for the Probit regression, the percentage of correct predictions, 
with a success cut-off of 0.5, and the percentage gain in correct predictions from 
using the estimated equation as opposed to one of constant probability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Using Whites general test with and without cross terms, see Gujarati (2003) page 413. 
14 See Gujarati (2003) page 417. 
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Table 6: Summary of Regressions (pooled data)15 16
   
Conditional Model 
Variable OLS Probit OLS
 
C 
 
-3.531146** 
(0.525797) 
 
-4.255966** 
(0.438579) 
 
3.049328** 
(0.675236) 
WAGE 0.774085** 
(0.056150) 
0.445787** 
(0.047465) 
0.211618** 
(0.074655) 
WAGE^2 -0.010667** 
(0.001894) 
-0.008907** 
(0.001877) 
0.003602 
(0.002378) 
AGE 0.035284* 
(0.016459) 
0.058074** 
(0.014247) 
-0.004499 
(0.016040) 
FEMALE 1.169831** 
(0.095828) 
0.312584** 
(0.074685) 
1.162586** 
(0.093427) 
OUTOFPROV -0.368208** 
(0.126634) 
-0.398594** 
(0.090609) 
-0.017326 
(0.128769) 
OUTOFCANADA -0.403747** 
(0.125250) 
0.245298* 
(0.099695) 
0.723266** 
(0.124419) 
NONECONMAJOR -0.131535 
(0.104366) 
0.031774 
(0.076923) 
-0.158094 
(0.099942) 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.199310** 
(0.062432) 
-0.030971 
(0.044029) 
-0.227652** 
(0.060922) 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.483385** 
(0.140325) 
0.315072** 
(0.110643) 
0.249418 
(0.134135) 
UNIONEXP*EMPLOYMENTEXP -0.099005 
(0.120410) 
-0.227575** 
(0.088025) 
0.099095 
(0.115622) 
FULLTIME -0.368198** 
(0.107429) 
-0.283184** 
(0.081974) 
-0.161931 
(0.105969) 
EILOWEROREQUAL -1.004359** 
(0.200620) 
-0.646003** 
(0.112571) 
-0.434244** 
(0.128399) 
EIHIGHER -0.420743** 
(0.137199) 
0.030279 
(0.141770) 
-0.243623 
(0.267533 
WAGELOWER -1.524015** 
(0.176200) 
-0.789013** 
(0.103623) 
-0.897910** 
(0.237234) 
WAGEHIGHER -0.003907 
(0.140718) 
0.013188 
(0.222687) 
0.067461 
(0.130854) 
WAGEEQUAL -0.727054* 
(0.323625) 
-0.396534 
(0.207414) 
-0.523200 
(0.283263) 
SUPERVISION 
 
-0.102564 
(0.127279) 
-0.276557** 
(0.091897) 
0.173846 
(0.120576) 
 
Adjusted R^2/McFadden R^2 
 
0.577081 
 
0.450346 
 
0.398916 
F-stat/LR-stat 240.7536** 1451.077** 89.08682** 
# of observations 2988 2988 2301 
Percent correct  86.51  
Percent gain 
 
 41.34  
 
                                                 
15 * indicates significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
16 Base group are male subjects from Saskatchewan majoring in economics with no employment 
experience and facing wage offers in the first market. 
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 A discussion of the regressions is presented in points below. Attention is paid 
to the size and direction of the coefficients, the statistical and economic significance 
of the variables, the differences between the two models and the implications the 
results have for Hypotheses A through D. This discussion is limited to examining the 
effects of the variables on the EFFORT dependant variable, the first model and the 
second stage of the conditional model. An examination of the effects of the variables 
on ACCEPT, the Probit specification, are presented in more depth following this 
discussion. 
? The coefficients on the WAGE and WAGE^2 variables present a statistically 
significant positive and concave relationship with effort in the first model. In 
the second stage of the conditional model the coefficient on WAGE is still 
positive and significant, but the coefficient on WAGE^2 is now positive. The 
positive coefficient on WAGE^2 would indicate a convex relationship with 
wage, but the estimate is statistically insignificant, so the relationship may be 
interpreted as having no significant curvature in the second stage of the 
conditional model. The positive relationship has been found in all previous 
studies, with the exception of Rigdon (2002). A concave relationship has also 
been found in studies conducted by: Fehr, Tougavera and Fischbacher (2002); 
Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gachter (1998); and Hannan, Kagel and 
Moser (2002). This positive relationship found in the regressions conforms to 
the predictions of the fair wage-effort hypothesis and Hypothesis A. 
? The joint significance of the variables including WAGE, this includes 
WAGE^2 and the interaction terms, may be a better examination of their 
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significance than the t-tests presented in the regression output. Conducting F-
tests for the joint significance of the WAGE variables yields statistical 
significance for all regressions.17 
? The coefficient on WAGE is also of an analytically significant size in both 
models, though larger in the first. For example increasing the wage offer from 
8 to 10 yields an increase in estimated effort of 1.2 in the first model and 0.6 
in the second. This follows from the exclusion of the zero observations in the 
second stage of the conditional model. The inclusion of the zeros would drag 
the intercept of the model downwards and, holding other things constant, 
would increase the slope of the regression line. Therefore, including the zeros 
increases the size of the coefficient on WAGE, relative to the model where 
zeros are excluded.  
? The FEMALE variable is also statistically significant in both models. Relative 
to the base group a female subject makes a higher effort choice for a given 
wage. This may also be interpreted as female subjects requiring a lower wage 
for a given effort level. For example if the estimated effort level of the base 
group is 5, a female subject would have an estimated effort of 6.2 in the first 
model and 6.2 in the conditional model. Contrary to the predictions made in 
Chapter Three and the findings of Charness and Levine (2003), gender plays 
an economic and statistically significant role in the relationship examined 
here. This effect may result from the lower wage expectations women may 
have and possibly from the higher effort levels women may have to put forth 
to stand out in the labour market. Socialization and cultural differences may 
                                                 
17 See Appendix Two for all F-test statistics. 
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also play a role. For example; women may be socialized towards more 
commitment to the workplace, or towards a higher level of cooperation (Eckel 
and Grossman, 1998). The validity of these explanations is subject for further 
study. 
? OUTOFPROV has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the 
first model, but is statistically insignificant in the second stage of the 
conditional model. The effect is of negligible analytical significance in the 
both models; it decreases the predicted effort choice by 0.4 in the first model 
and 0.02 in the conditional model. Higher wage expectations possessed by 
subjects originating outside of Saskatchewan may cause this effect to exist. 
The effect present here is in opposition to the predictions made in Chapter 
Three and to the findings regarding regional differences made by Fehr, 
Fischbacher and Tougavera (2002). OUTOFCANADA, the other variable 
used to capture the effects of place of origin, also has a negative coefficient. 
In contrast to OUTOFPROV this coefficient maintains its statistical 
significance across the two models. The size of the effect is also considerable 
larger in the conditional model, -0.7 compared to -0.4; this may be due to the 
effects of examining only the positive effort choices and not the choices to 
decline the wage offer. Subjects in this study with a place of origin outside of 
Canada have a lower predicted effort than those from Canada. This effect may 
follow from higher wage expectations possessed by subjects originating from 
outside of Canada or from a lack of understanding of the labour market by 
subjects not familiar with Canada’s labour market structure and laws, for 
 80
example they may have little knowledge of the minimum wage laws and 
unemployment benefits available in Canada. The effects that 
OUTOFCANADA have on the wage-effort relationship also oppose the 
predictions made in Chapter Three and the findings of previous studies. 
? In line with the predictions made in Chapter Three the coefficient on the 
YEAROFSTUDY is negative and statistically significant in both models. The 
effect is not very large, approximately -0.2 in the first model and -0.2 in the 
conditional model, so the statistical significance may be discounted by the 
small size of the variable. The effect also does not differ much between the 
two models. Economic significance aside, this result matches the predictions 
made in Chapter Three; as a subject progresses through their program of study 
they develop a more concrete conception of their expected wage and therefore 
require a higher wage for a given level of effort. 
? EMPLOYMENTEXP also matches the predictions made in Chapter Three. A 
positive coefficient was predicted, as subjects with more labour market 
experience have a greater understanding of how their effort levels may be 
rewarded with higher wages. The coefficients estimated here are positive and 
statistically significant in the first model only. The effect in the conditional 
model is considerably smaller than in the first, approximately half the size of 
the first model’s coefficient; it only increases the predicted effort by around 
0.25, as opposed to the first model where it increases effort by about 0.5. 
? In contrast to the expectation of no significant effect for the FULLTIME 
variable, a statistically significant effect was found for the first model; the 
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conditional model yielded a statistically insignificant estimate. Coefficients in 
both models are negative and of marginal size. These estimates are in line 
with the predictions made in Chapter Three, though their effects are small. 
? The AGE, NONECONMAJOR and UNIONEXP coefficients are all 
statistically and economically insignificant for both models; except for 
UNIONEXP in the probit model, which then has a small negative coefficient. 
This is in contrast to the predictions made in Chapter Three; positive 
coefficients for AGE and NONECONMAJOR and a negative coefficient for 
UNIONEXP.  
? Hypotheses B and C can both be confirmed by the regression results of the 
first model; the conditional model can only lend its support to Hypotheses C. 
The coefficients on the dummies measuring the effect of the unemployment 
benefit demonstrate that the presence of the benefit has a negative effect on 
the effort choice made. This effect is larger when the wage offer is lower than 
or equal to the benefit; this can be seen in the larger coefficient on 
EILOWEROREQUAL than the coefficient on EIHIGHER. The dummy 
variables for co-worker wages also find different effect sizes dependant on the 
wage offer. For wage offers above the co-worker wage of 14$/hr there is no 
significant effect. For wage offers equal to or below the co-worker wage there 
is a negative effect on effort choice; with the effect being larger when the 
offer is lower than the co-worker wage then when it is equal, -1.5 versus -0.7. 
This reflects the observations made in the significance tests on the conditional 
means between the markets. Recall that the only significant differences 
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between market one and the other markets was when the wage offers were 
below the unemployment benefit or the co-worker wage. The large effect that 
COWORKERWAGE presents is opposite to the findings of Charness and 
Kuhn (2004), who found co-worker wages to have no effect on the wage-
effort relationship. The coefficient on SUPERVISION is statistically 
insignificant except in the first stage of the conditional model, where it has a 
slight negative effect. 
 
To extend this analysis to include the Probit model, the first stage of the 
conditional model, the marginal effects calculated at the independent variable 
means are included in Table 7 below. The marginal effects are calculated as 
follows. 
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Following Table 7 is a series of points regarding the implications of the Probit 
model and the differences between the first model and the conditional model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Marginal Effects (Probit Model) 
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Variable Mean 
 
Marginal Effect 
WAGE 14.00000 
WAGE^2 222.67000 0.081873 
AGE 22.97600 0.010666 
FEMALE 0.37349   0.057410 
OUTOFPROV 0.14458 -0.073207 
OUTOFCANADA 0.28916 0.045052 
NONECONMAJOR 0.53012 0.007696 
YEAROFSTUDY 2.83130 -0.005835 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.79552 0.057867 
UNIONEXP 0.24096 -0.041797 
FULLTIME 0.46988 -0.052010 
EILOWEROREQUAL 0.08333 -0.118650 
EIHIGHER 0.16667 0.005561 
WAGELOWER 0.11111 -0.144910 
WAGEEQUAL 0.02778 -0.072828 
WAGEHIGHER 0.11111 0.002422 
SUPERVISION 0.25000 -0.050793 
 
? WAGE has a positive and statistically significant effect on the decision to 
accept a wage offer. Like in the first model the relationship is also concave, 
the coefficient on WAGE^2 is negative. The variable’s effects are also 
economically significant; the marginal effects show that increasing the wage 
by 1 dollar increases the probability of accepting the wage offer by 8.1 
percent. 
? The estimate of the coefficient for OUTOFCANADA is positive and 
statistically significant. This is differs from the negative coefficients found for 
the variable in the first model and in the second stage of the conditional 
model. OUTOFCANADA has a negative effect on effort, but a positive one 
on the decision to accept a wage offer. In other words, a subject from outside 
Canada is more likely to accept an offer for a given wage and also will choose 
a lower effort level for that wage, than a subject from Canada. This effect is 
also economically significant, it has a marginal effect of 0.04; a subject from 
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outside Canada is 4% more likely to accept a given wage offer than a subject 
from Canada. 
? A number of the variables have coefficients which present an interesting 
change when estimating the two models. These variables are statistically 
significant in the first model, but statistically insignificant in the second stage 
of the conditional model. They are, however, statistically significant in the 
first stage of the conditional model; their effects have been shifted from 
affecting EFFORT to affecting ACCEPT. In other words, what initially 
affected the subject’s effort choice now only affects the decision to accept or 
decline the wage offer; it has no effect on the effort choice once the decision 
to accept the wage offer has been made. The first model has incorrectly 
estimated the variables effects on EFFORT. These variables include 
OUTOFPROV, EMPLOYMENTEXP, and FULLTIME. OUTOFPROV has a 
negative coefficient and is statistically and economically significant; its 
marginal effect is -0.07. This may reflect subjects from outside of 
Saskatchewan having higher wage expectations. EMPLOYMENTEXP has a 
positive and statistically and economically significant coefficient also; its 
marginal effect is 0.04. FULLTIME has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient; its marginal effect is -0.05. These variables all note effects that 
differ between the first and the conditional model. 
? The SUPERVISION variable, noting observations resulting from market four, 
also has a very interesting implication when estimated using the conditional 
model. While it had statistically and economically insignificant coefficients in 
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the first model and the second stage of the conditional model, it now has a 
negative and statistically and economically significant effect in the Probit 
model; its marginal effect is -0.05. Supervision may not affect the provision of 
effort but it does have a negative effect on the decision to accept the wage 
offer initially. This may follow from a high degree of supervision making the 
job uncomfortable and causing potential employees to decline the offer unless 
paid a wage high enough to compensate for this aspect of the job; once the job 
has been accepted the effort level of the employee is not further affected by 
the degree of supervision. The lack of negative effect found here is consistent 
with alternative viewpoints which posit that low supervision can be consistent 
with high effort levels (Altman, 2002). 
? Observations resulting from the third market, the one containing knowledge 
of co-worker wages, also have a negative effect on the decision to accept the 
wage offer. This effect depends on whether or not the wage offer in question 
is above or below the co-worker wage of 14$/hr. If the wage is lower, the 
WAGELOWER variable, the marginal effect is quite large, about 14%, as 
opposed to when the wage offer is higher than, the WAGEHIGHER variable, 
or equal, the WAGEEQUAL variable, to the co-worker wage, 0.2% and 7% 
respectively. Subjects seem to take into account wage inequity vary strongly 
when making their decisions on acceptance. Like the first model the wage 
offers below or equal to the co-worker wage also have a statistically 
significant negative effect on effort choice, with lower wages having a greater 
negative effect than wages equal to the co-worker wage. Like co-worker 
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wages the response to wage offers in the market in which unemployment 
benefits are present is dependant upon the level of the wage offer. For wage 
offers below or equal to the benefit, EILOWEROREQUAL, the marginal 
effect is much larger, 11%, when compared to wage offers above the benefit, 
EIHIGHER has a marginal effect of 0.5%. Like the first model the conditional 
models second stage presents negative coefficients for the market two dummy 
variables, though EIHIGHER loses its statistical significance in the 
conditional model and the coefficients are smaller than in the first model. 
? Another variable which maintains it statistical and economic significance 
between the two stages of the conditional model is FEMALE. It has a positive 
effect on both the decision to accept a wage offer and the provision of effort 
for that wage offer. The marginal effect is also of an economically significant 
size; it is 0.05. This may reflect the lower wages female subjects may require 
when accepting a wage offer and the lower wages they may require for a 
given level of effort.  
? One more interesting difference between the two stages in the conditional 
model involves the effects of YEAROFSTUDY. It has a statistically and 
economically insignificant positive effect on ACCEPT in stage one and a 
statistically and economically significant negative effect on EFFORT in stage 
two. It is the only variable to behave in this manner; all other variables affect 
either both stages or only stage one and not stage two. YEAROFSTUDY 
seems to have no significant effect on the decision to accept a wage offer, but 
has a significant effect on the effort choice decision. 
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 4.2.1.1 Elasticity 
 The Solow (1979) condition states that the efficiency wage will only exist if 
the elasticity of effort with respect to wage must be equal to unity. This is based on a 
production function in which wages enter in a labour augmenting manner. Many 
efficiency wage theories construct their models to reflect this condition18. It is not 
appropriate to discuss the results generated here in relation to the Solow condition, 
only the relationship between effort and wages has been examined, not between 
wages and productivity. In order to examine the relevance of the Solow condition it 
would be necessary to impose production functions and insert the estimated effort 
choice functions from the survey into these production functions. The other 
experimental studies examining the Solow condition have also derived their 
conclusions from the specification of the production function they have imposed. 
Differing production functions would have different conclusions regarding the 
relevance of the Solow condition. 
The regression estimated for the pooled markets may be used to estimate this 
elasticity. Because of the interaction terms between the wage and market dummy 
variables the elasticities are calculated for each market in the first model and each 
market in the second stage of the conditional model. The elasticity calculated here 
measures the ratio of the percentage change in effort generated from the same 
percentage change in the wage offer. The formula used is detailed below. 
E
W
W
Eelasticity ∂
∂=  
                                                 
18 See Akerlof (1982) page 562. 
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For the regressions estimated this yields 
E
WDtCoefficienDummyMarketWelasticity )**2( 21 ++= ββ  
The results of using the regressions are listed in Table 8 below. They have been 
separated by the market they pertain to and the equation used to estimate them. 
 
Table 8: Elasticity of Effort with respect to Wage (pooled markets)19
 
Elasticity of Effort with respect to Wage 
 
 
Model Market One Market Two Market Three Market Four
 
OLS 
 
1.314443** 1.381103**
 
1.558081** 1.315656**
Stage Two of 
Conditional 
Model (OLS) 
 
0.789049** 0.738673** 0.917179** 0.730330**
 
 Table 8 shows that the estimated elasticities are close to unity; t-tests of the 
elasticity being equal to unity to reject the null hypothesis though. In the second stage 
of the conditional model they are elastic and in the second stage of the conditional 
model they are inelastic; this is probably due to the expulsion of the zeros in the 
second stage of the conditional model. This means that in the first model the effort 
choice is more responsive to a wage change than in the conditional model. Market 
three seems to be more elastic compared to the other markets, which all seem to have 
quite similar elasticities. An additional effect of the inclusion of co-worker wages 
seems to be an increase in elasticity relative to the other markets. The knowledge of 
                                                 
19 ** denotes a statistically significant difference from 1 at the significance level of .01, * denotes the 
same at the significance level of .05. For the formula used to calculate the t-tests used to test the null 
hypothesis of unit elasticity see the appendix three. 
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co-worker wages may increase the responsiveness of effort choice to wages because 
they now have more information to base their decision of effort choice on. 
 
4.2.2 Separate Markets 
The data gathered using the survey can also be examined by separating the 
observations and estimating separate regressions for each market; as opposed to the 
pooled regressions, which use dummy variables to capture market differences. The 
models used are the same as in the pooled markets section. The first model is an OLS 
estimation including the zero effort choices. The second model, or conditional model, 
involves an initial stage, a Probit regression with ACCEPT as the dependant variable, 
and a second stage, an OLS regression excluding the zero effort choices. Table 9 
summarizes the regression results for the first model. Tables 10 and 11 summarize the 
regression results for the first and second stage of the conditional model.  
As the estimated contained in the tables reveal, no new insight is gained from 
the separation of the data into individual markets. The statistical significance of many 
of the variables has changes; variables which were significant in the pooled 
regressions are now insignificant, the economic significance of the variable is also 
questionable.  
Occasionally a coefficient has also changed sign from its corresponding 
estimate in the pooled regressions, resulting in an estimate which no longer makes 
sense in the context of the model; for instance the positive coefficients on WAGE^2 
in the second stage of the conditional model for markets one through three. This may 
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not be of great concern because both the statistical and economic significance of the 
variable are also negligible. 
The weaker results of the separate markets estimates are probably due to the 
decrease in sample size for each regression relative to its corresponding pooled 
markets regression; Tables 9 through 11 below list these weaker results. 
 
Table 9: OLS (separate markets) 
  
OLS 
Variable Market One Market Two Market Three Market Four 
 
C 
 
 
-5.610917** 
(0.927130) 
 
-3.494077** 
(0.913349) 
 
-3.926812** 
(0.912510) 
 
-5.691308** 
(1.091505) 
WAGE 
 
0.955585** 
(0.099034) 
0.843401** 
(0.097922) 
0.659337** 
(0.100899) 
0.933379** 
(0.112083) 
WAGE^2 
 
-0.016714** 
(0.003438) 
-0.011823** 
(0.003483) 
-0.002904 
(0.003570) 
-0.015689** 
(0.003892) 
AGE 
 
0.061627 
(0.032218) 
-0.012295 
(0.030345) 
0.023549 
(0.029487) 
0.055081 
(0.036046) 
FEMALE 
 
1.238158** 
(0.192767) 
1.251113** 
(0.199441) 
1.113147** 
(0.195365) 
1.065032** 
(0.194823) 
OUTOFPROV 
 
-0.023635 
(0.259828) 
-0.525627* 
(0.234196) 
-0.702134** 
(0.250542) 
-0.299783 
(0.268302) 
OUTOFCANADA 
 
-0.365424 
(0.221405) 
-0.261051 
(0.272455) 
-0.477061 
(0.262409) 
-0.604475* 
(0.256772) 
NONECONMAJOR 
 
-0.160394 
(0.198366) 
-0.299077 
(0.211691) 
-0.302945 
(0.195187) 
0.303033 
(0.226127) 
YEAROFSTUDY 
 
-0.111797 
(0.127231) 
-0.276040* 
(0.126751) 
-0.266532* 
(0.112106) 
-0.037444 
(0.137977) 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 
 
0.367056 
(0.256131) 
0.420560 
(0.280311) 
0.657271* 
(0.294736) 
0.317228 
(0.279092) 
UNIONEXP 
 
-0.131304 
(0.248094) 
0.184064 
(0.231221) 
0.053165 
(0.223354) 
0.095399 
(0.239965( 
FULLTIME 
 
 
-0.235226 
(0.214449) 
-0.436472* 
(0.217328) 
-0.407647* 
(0.207538) 
-0.419368 
(0.224627) 
 
Adjusted R^2 
 
0.558206 
 
0.572772 
 
0.630175 
 
0.511219 
F-Stat 86.068802** 91.92175** 116.5611** 71.93147** 
# of Observations 
 
747 747 747 747 
 
Table 10: Probit/First stage of Conditional Model (separate markets)  
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Conditional Model (Probit/Stage One) 
Variable Market One Market Two Market Three Market Four 
 
C 
 
 
-5.944347** 
(0.872219) 
 
-4.462143** 
(1.048257) 
 
-4.015065** 
(0.896964) 
 
-8.444085** 
(1.639929) 
WAGE 
 
0.651261** 
(0.086529) 
0.421477** 
(0.148761) 
0.328221** 
(0.126967) 
0.676444** 
(0.171518) 
WAGE^2 
 
-0.015915** 
(0.003235) 
-0.004592 
(0.006774) 
-0.002449 
(0.005512) 
-0.010917 
(0.006997) 
AGE 
 
0.072535* 
(0.028340) 
0.033321 
(0.027466) 
0.041519 
(0.024872) 
0.149063** 
(0.050956) 
FEMALE 
 
0.303663 
(0.163025) 
0.480823** 
(0.155403) 
0.094005 
(0.139128) 
0.668604* 
(0.261541) 
OUTOFPROV 
 
-0.053484 
(0.194525) 
-0.361869 
(0.191977) 
-0.625010** 
(0.175989) 
-0.962660** 
(0.318857) 
OUTOFCANADA 
 
0.469333* 
(0.215969) 
0.313009 
(0.203967) 
0.096530 
(0.192720) 
0.216014 
(0.331649) 
NONECONMAJOR 
 
0.144645 
(0.161563) 
-0.001143 
(0.156078) 
-0.136065 
(0.143908) 
0.373905 
(0.263109) 
YEAROFSTUDY 
 
-0.007417 
(0.093568) 
-0.038657 
(0.091050) 
-0.005890 
(0.081519) 
-0.030160 
(0.156085) 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 
 
0.119912 
(0.232080) 
0.385206 
(0.227549) 
0.335279 
(0.210758) 
0.382290 
(0.359421) 
UNIONEXP 
 
-0.361219 
(0.188466) 
0.027935 
(0.178088) 
-0.120508 
(0.159712) 
-0.254597 
(0.296044) 
FULLTIME 
 
 
-0.151783 
(0.177304) 
-0.383753 
(0.170380) 
-0.171300 
(0.154541) 
-0.715678* 
(0.281264) 
 
McFadden R^2 
 
0.452216 
 
0.498705 
 
0.449881 
 
0.387164 
LR-Stat/F-stat 310.8671** 412.5573** 402.5804** 303.4572** 
# of Observations 747 747 747 747 
Percent Correct 88.89 87.42 85.14 85.01 
Percent Gain 
 
35.66 48.07 48.13 31.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: OLS/Second stage of Conditional Model (separate markets) 
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Conditional Model (OLS/Stage Two) 
Variable Market One Market Two Market Three Market Four 
 
C 
 
 
1.296004 
(0.145385) 
 
4.603865** 
(1.245752) 
 
1.949618 
(1.381825) 
 
2.114737 
(1.370335) 
WAGE 
 
0.295435* 
(0.128443) 
0.120647 
(0.135367) 
0.281644 
(0.156344) 
0.329931* 
(0.145571) 
WAGE^2 
 
0.001417 
(0.004176) 
0.006506 
(0.004400) 
0.003646 
(0.004911) 
-0.000822 
(0.004625) 
AGE 
 
0.027473 
(0.029040) 
-0.041150 
(0.033577) 
-0.009287 
(0.030726) 
-0.012802 
(0.033247) 
FEMALE 
 
1.256206** 
(0.182743) 
1.153121** 
(0.201854) 
1.420977** 
(0.189328) 
0.875021** 
(0.179485) 
OUTOFPROV 
 
-0.015810 
(0.255385) 
-0.305124 
(0.257938) 
-0.162380 
(0.277326) 
0.425014 
(0.223488) 
OUTOFCANADA 
 
-0.772365** 
(0.2206840 
-0.567323* 
(0.274619) 
-0.778169** 
(0.260274) 
-0.846392** 
(0.255170) 
NONECONMAJOR 
 
-0.259942 
(0.186130) 
-0.340237 
(0.210711) 
-0.161062 
(0.195002) 
0.173977 
(0.204661) 
YEAROFSTUDY 
 
-0.138205 
(0.123148) 
-0.327299* 
(0.129996) 
-0.327190** 
(0.109738) 
-0.038434 
(0.125944) 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 
 
0.304663 
(0.249853) 
0.140702 
(0.274983) 
0.388670 
(0.290063) 
0.080716 
(0.253122) 
UNIONEXP 
 
0.140595 
(0.232238) 
0.204994 
(0.234721) 
0.221258 
(0.221258) 
0.256441 
(0.208348) 
FULLTIME 
 
 
-0.147170 
(0.204771) 
-0.206587 
(0.226296) 
-0.384554 
(0.204011) 
0.063930 
(0.212246) 
 
Adjusted R^2 
 
0.405830 
 
0.331324 
 
0.473617 
 
0.352677 
F-stat 39.31121** 23.45025** 44.51561** 29.87561** 
# of Observations 
 
618 566 533 584 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Elasticity 
 Estimated of the elasticity of effort with respect to wage was also calculated 
for the regressions generated by the separating the data according to market. The 
same formula and procedures were used as in the pooled markets section20, the 
only difference being the absence of market dummy variables. The elasticity 
estimates are listed in Table 12 below.  
                                                 
20 See appendix three 
 93
Table 12: Elasticity of Effort with respect to Wage (separate markets) 
  
Elasticity of Effort with respect to Wage 
Model Market One Market Two Market Three Market Four 
 
OLS 
 
1.226962** 1.449738**
 
1.684779** 1.266772**
Stage Two of 
Conditional 
model (OLS) 
 
0.770151** 0.792412** 0.953332 0.726244**
 
The estimates listed in Table 12 are similar to those obtained in the pooled 
market regressions: the first model has higher elasticises than the conditional 
model; marker three is more elastic than the other models; and the estimates are 
all close to one. A difference that occurs between the pooled and separate 
regressions is that the null hypothesis of unit elasticity can not be rejected in the 
third market of the conditional model. 
4.3 Analytical/Economic Significance 
 In the discussion of the regressions above the term analytically significant was 
used to describe a variable’s coefficient. The term means that the variable in question, 
aside from being statistically significant, is of a size large enough that it would have 
some impact on the analysis of the economic theory in question. For example the 
WAGE variable has estimated coefficients around the range of 0.7 to 0.9, for a dollar 
increase in wage the effort input increases by approximately 0.8. Is this of a size large 
enough to be important to the theory? An increase of one unit of effort choice may 
seem small, but the scale only extends from zero to ten; an increase of around one is 
about ten percent of the overall possibility of effort choices; this is large enough to be 
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of importance. In contrast to the WAGE variable the AGE variable has coefficients 
that are statistically significant, but are of a very small size, ranging from 0.03 to 
0.05. For an increase in the age of the subject the estimated effort choice would 
increase by 0.03 to 0.05, considerably less than the increase brought about by wage. 
The variable AGE therefore could be viewed as having no real analytical significance 
to the discussion of the theory in question. In order to comment on the economic 
significance of the variables it would be necessary to assume some sort of production 
functions in order to gauge the variable’s impact on the economy, therefore the term 
analytical significance is used here. The importance of the wage-effort choice 
relationship to the economy depends on how the effort choice increases brought about 
by wages translates into increased productivity. Various wage-productivity curves 
would lead to differing conclusions about the importance of these results. Assuming a 
direct one to one relationship between effort and productivity, higher wages would 
result in significantly higher productivity levels. Other assumed relationships would 
produce a spectrum of conclusions about the effort enhancing effects of higher wages 
importance to the economy. 
 The majority of the other variables examined in the regressions are of no 
considerable size or analytical significance, with the notable exception of the 
variables FEMALE, WAGELOWER, WAGEEQUAL and EILOWEROREQUAL. 
The largest of the dummy variables is WAGELOWER. The presence of this variable 
results in a decrease in the amount of effort chosen by 1.5 units. For a subject 
choosing an effort level of eight, the presence of the knowledge that similar co-
workers are receiving a wage of 14 dollars an hour, reduces the effort choice level to 
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6.5; this is a decrease in the effort level of about 19%. For other changes this 
percentage of course would depend on where the subject initially is operating 
regarding effort choice. The large decrease in effort choice emphasizes the 
importance of internal wage equity as noted by many managers (Bewley, 1999). The 
presence of an unemployment benefit similarly reduces the effort choice, but by one 
unit, this still is large enough to have an economically significant effect. The 
FEMALE variable moves in opposition to the market dummy variables. Female 
subjects make an effort choice of about 1.2 units higher than those of male subjects 
receiving the same wage. The percentage increase of the presence of this variable, 
like the market variables, depends on the initial effort level the subject is at. 
Assuming a male subject has chosen an effort level of eight for a given wage, a 
female subject is estimated to choose an effort level of 9.2, an increase of 15%, 
slightly less than the WAGELOWER variable, but still quite large. How this affects 
the productivity of the firm once again depends on the relationship between effort and 
productivity.  
 The marginal effects of the first stage of the conditional model can also be 
discussed in terms of economic significance. Does an increase in the probability of 
accepting a wage offer of 8.1%, resulting from an increase in the wage of 1 dollar an 
hour, have any economic significance? It is less than the estimated marginal effects 
for WAGELOWER (-14.9%) and EILOWEROREQUAL (-11.8), but larger than that 
of FEMALE (5.7); all other estimated marginal effects were very small, this is 
probably a result of the very high amount of wage offers that were accepted. The 
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significance of these effects to the economy and the theory is in doubt here, 8.1% 
does not seem like a very large number. 
 Unlike statistical significance, which has explicitly defined ranges and points 
used to determine its existence, economic and analytical significance has no easily 
defined boundaries. In this study making these definitions is further complicated from 
its abstraction from reality; an artificial labour market is being examined, with effort 
choice not real effort being examined.  
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Chapter five: Conclusion 
  The data generated by the survey provide strong support for certain 
predictions of the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis: a positive relationship between wages 
and effort; unemployment benefits producing a negative effect on the wage-effort 
relationship; and knowledge of co-worker wages, specifically knowledge of wage 
inequity, exhibits a negative effect on the wage-effort relationship.  
To pose these results in terms of the Hypotheses outlined in the introduction, 
the data shows strong support for Hypothesis A: wage increases correspond to effort 
increases. In the case of Hypothesis B the negative effect is stronger when the wage is 
equal to or less than the wage offer, when faced with a wage offer higher than the 
unemployment benefit the negative effect is about half as strong. Hypothesis C is also 
only partially correct, the negative effect is only present when the knowledge of co-
worker wages results in the subject facing a relatively lower wage offer; for wages 
greater than or equal to 14 there is no significant difference between markets one and 
three. Also the variables WAGELOWER and WAGEEQUAL are statistically 
significant, not WAGEHIGHER. No evidence exists for the acceptance of Hypothesis 
D; the only effect it has is on the decision to accept the wage offer, there is no 
significant effect on the choice of effort. 
Aside from the Hypotheses A through D, a number of other interesting results 
have been illuminated by the regressions. The gender of the subject, which previously 
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was found to have no significant effect (Charness and Levine, 2003), has a large 
statistically and economically significant positive effect; female subjects choose a 
higher level of effort for a given wage than male subjects. This could also be 
interpreted as female subjects requiring a lower wage for a given effort level. 
 Place of origin was also found to exhibit significant effects not found in 
previous studies (Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougavera, 2002). Subjects from outside 
Canada provide lower effort for a given wage than subjects originating from Canada, 
but are more likely to accept a given wage offer than Canadian subjects. 
The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis has found substantiation in the data 
generated by the survey. A positive relationship was found between wages and effort; 
increasing the wage offers lead to an increase in the choice of effort provision. This 
relationship was also found to be concave; there are declining returns in effort for 
corresponding wage increases. Previous lab experiments have also reported a positive 
concave relationship and replication of this relationship was an interest of this thesis. 
While often disparaged as ineffectual and incorrect, the survey has shown that 
it can replicate the previous laboratory experiments. It also has produced a number of 
interesting results that have not previously been found. Gender variables that were 
previously found insignificant, now have a statistically and economic significance. 
Co-worker wages were also previously found insignificant, in this survey they are 
quite the opposite. A variable that has not been included in past studies, 
unemployment benefits, was also found to have a significant, though not as large, 
effect like co-worker wages.  
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A number of practical applications stemming from the results of this 
investigation can also be mentioned. The large negative effect found when wage 
inequity, precisely when the subject receives wages lower than the wages of co-
workers, emphasizes the importance of wage equity. This result recommends firms 
move towards higher degrees of wage equity if possible or institute a wage secrecy 
policy in which wages are not discussed in the firm or are not made public.  
The effort choice augmenting effect of wages also may play a role in firm or 
public policy. Wage increases need not necessarily result in overall cost increases for 
the firm, they may in fact lead to profit increases depending on the shape of the 
production function. Firms may then expect higher wages to not only create larger 
labour pools to choose workers from, but possibly higher productivity and profit and 
therefore need not institute a policy of low wages. With regards to public policy the 
labour augmenting effect of wages emphasizes the importance of avoiding low wage 
policies. If the economy is not maximizing the amount of productivity that can be 
achieved due to a lower wage structure, then it would not be operating on the 
boundary of the production possibility frontier and an amount of lost production or 
inefficiency would be present. Policy formation avoiding situations such as this 
would then be advisable. 
Concern that remains over the validity of these results, stemming from the use 
of a survey, could be addressed by converting the features of the survey into a 
simulated labour market experiment. The survey was designed to remain as close as 
possible to the structure of the laboratory experiments, moving the other way 
shouldn’t present much of a problem. Using the basic design outlined in Chapter Two 
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and adding the market features included in the survey, would result in a similarly 
structured lab experiment that could be used to further test the relevance of 
Hypotheses A through D. 
Another question remaining is how the positive relationship between wages 
and effort translates into more productivity. In other words, what does the 
relationship between wages and productivity look like? The concern of much of 
economics is how various things affect the economy, so how wages affect 
productivity and the economy as a whole is an important question. Previous 
experiments have imposed a production function on the subjects representing firms 
and workers. They new explicitly how an effort choice translated into increased 
productivity for the firm. This was not done in the survey presented here; the concern 
was on the effect of wages on effort. The validity of the production functions 
imposed, or how the function should be modeled to accurately reflect reality, is 
subject to further debate and research. 
 The data examined here lends further weight to the importance of examining 
the assumptions of neoclassical economics in an experimental setting and the validity 
of Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis form of efficiency wages. Continued experimental 
examination, be it in a laboratory or survey setting, would be of value in the further 
refinement and expansion of economic theory. 
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 Appendix One: Ethics Application and Approval 
Application for Approval of Research Protocol 
 
1. Researcher: Evan Edward Meredith, M.A. student, Department of Economics 
            Supervisor: Morris Altman, Professor, Department of Economics 
 
1a. Student: Evan Edward Meredith, M.A. student 
 
1b.       Anticipated start date of study: 
            Anticipated completion date of study: 
 
2.         Title of Study: Experimental Investigation of the Fair Wage-Effort 
Hypothesis 
 
3.         Abstract: The failure of labour markets to clear, even in the long run, is a 
phenomenon that has long been a concern of economists. In an attempt to explain this 
failure a number of efficiency wage theories have been developed. Among these is 
the possible labour augmenting effects of wages (Solow, 1979). This theory was 
further elaborated on by Akerlof (1982) who developed a somewhat sociological 
explanation of the labour market as a partial gift exchange dependant on the norms of 
fairness. In this partial gift exchange the gift of a higher than market clearing wage, or 
fair wage, is reciprocated by higher that minimum effort. The fair wage is dependant 
on the workers frame of reference. This frame includes such arguments as past wages, 
coworkers’ wages, the unemployment rate, and unemployment benefits. The goal of 
this research is to examine what effects, if any, a change in the level of these 
arguments has on the level of dependency of effort on wages. 
 Hypothesis A: Effort is positively correlated with wages. Higher wages will 
correspond to a higher choice of effort. 
 Hypothesis B: An increase in possible unemployment benefits will reduce the 
amount of effort for a corresponding wage from the effort put forth in the absence of 
unemployment benefits. As unemployment benefits increase, the workers conception 
of a fair wage also increases, and to elicit the same effort as previous a higher wage 
must be offered. 
 Hypothesis C: The observance of a coworkers’ wage will have negative 
effects on effort for a wage lower than the coworkers and positive effects on effort for 
a wage higher than the coworkers. Workers base their evaluation of the fairness of the 
wage offer on the reference point of similar workers wages. If their wages are lower 
they will deem the wage unfair and reduce their effort accordingly. If their wages are 
higher they will deem the wage as exceeding the fair wage and will increase their 
effort accordingly. 
 Hypothesis D: The degree to which workers are supervised or monitored will 
have an effect on the effort they put forth. Working under a small degree of 
monitoring reduces the chances of being caught shirking. Therefore a worker who 
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feels they are receiving an unfair wage may reduce their effort with less chance of 
retribution from their employers. 
 
4.         Funding: None. 
 
5.         Expertise: The research does not involve special or vulnerable populations, 
distinct cultural groups, and is not above minimal risk. 
 
6.         Conflict of Interest: The research involves no known potential conflicts of   
interest. 
 
7.         Participants: Participants will be solicited through announcements in 
undergraduate economics classes, posters placed in various areas on campus, and/or 
asking students walking down hallways on campus to participate. 
 
7a.       Recruitment Material: Poster is attached in addendum. 
 
8.         Consent: The participants will be informed of their rights and will signify 
their understanding of these rights through the reading and subsequent signing of a 
consent form. Participants will be informed that they may refrain from answering any 
of the survey questions they choose not to and may withdraw from the research at any 
time they wish to, with the information gathered from them to be destroyed upon 
their request. If they wish to withdraw without others knowing they may not fill out 
the survey, wait, and turn it in when the other participants do. The consent form is 
attached in addendum. 
 
9.         Methods/Procedures: The proposed research will require the participants to 
complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire will be administered to them in a 
classroom. The questionnaire to be used is attached in addendum. Before the issuing 
of the questionnaire the participants will be asked to carefully read and sign a consent 
form. The instructions for the completion of the questionnaire will be printed on the 
survey forms. Any questions the participants will be addressed at any time during the 
research. 
 
10.       Storage of Data: Data storage will be the responsibility of the researcher and 
will be stored in hard copy form, as completed surveys, and on a computer disk. As 
the consent forms will be stored separately from the surveys, which contain no 
identifying questions, the potential loss of confidentiality is low. All data will be 
stored by the research supervisor for a minimum of 5 years after the completion of the 
study. 
 
11.       Dissemination of Results: The collected data will be used in the development 
of a M.A. thesis. 
 
12.       Risk, Benefits, and Deception: There are no known risks or benefits in the 
study and it involves no amount of deception. 
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13.       Confidentiality: The collected data will be published and presented at 
seminars, but will be presented aggregate form so no possible individual 
identification can be made. Also the consent forms will be stored separately from the 
surveys so no names can be associated with the corresponding answers. The 
participants will also be asked to put no identifying information on the 
questionnaires.  
 
14.       Data/Transcript Release: The participants will only be asked to respond to 
questions with very short answers (i.e. numerical effort choice, major of study) and 
there will be no direct words to identify that participant. The anonymity of 
participants will not be compromised. 
 
15.       Debriefing and Feedback: A copy of the thesis containing the results of this 
research will be made available in the Department of Economics Library (Timlin 
Room). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.       Required Signatures: 
 Supervisor and Department Head  Student 
 
  
        
                                          Morris Altman                                        Evan Edward 
Meredith 
       Dean of College 
 
 
 
                                    Jo-Anne Dillon 
 
 
 
17. Contact Name and Information:  
            Evan Edward Meredith, Tel: (306)652-4485 
            Email: eem566@mail.usask.ca
            Address: 901 B Temperance Street, Saskatoon, Sask. S7N 0N3, Canada. 
Wage-Effort Survey 
 
 Please read the instructions carefully and respond to the corresponding 
questions appropriately. If you find any question objectionable you may refrain from 
answering it. Also please do not put your name or any other identifying 
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information on the questionnaire. You may also withdraw from the study at 
anytime and the information provided by you with be destroyed on your request. 
 
 
Instructions for Wage/Effort Response 
Please read the following instructions carefully. 
 In the following four sections you will be asked to respond to a wage offer, in 
terms of dollars per hour, with an effort choice.  
The wage offer is for a job which you would expect to obtain upon 
completion of your degree.  
There will be four job markets which differ in certain ways. Please take note 
of these differences when making your choices regarding the wage offers. 
In the job markets a wage offer will be presented to you and you will make a 
choice to accept or decline the offer. If you accept this wage offer you will be asked 
to indicate the level of effort you would put forth in this job, given the wage you are 
paid. The number zero will indicate you have declined the offer. A number between 1 
and 10 will indicate the amount of effort you would put forth if accepting the job. 1 
represent a very low level of effort and 10 a very high level of effort.  
The possible responses are noted in the table below. When making your 
choice please circle your responses in the tables presented.  
 
Table of Possible Response Choices  
              0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
(Decline the offer)           (very low effort………………………..very high effort) 
 
Part A 
Please provide the following information. 
 
 Age:           :                           
 Gender: (Male / Female) 
 Place of Origin: (Province:                            / Outside of Canada ) 
 Your area of study (Major):                         : 
 Year in the program:         : 
 Have you held paid employment before: (yes / no)  
 Was the job: ( full time / part time ) 
Was the job union: (yes / no) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B 
Please respond to the wage offers in the following four sections while 
taking into account the differences between the four markets. 
Market 1 
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In this market there is no unemployment insurance, you have no knowledge of what 
wages workers in similar positions with similar experience/education are receiving, 
and there is a small probability that you may be caught when providing low effort.  
      
Please circle your response in the table below 
Response to Wage Offer Wage Offer 
$/hour Decline                                          Accept/ Effort Level 
6 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
14 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
12 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
16 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
10 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
8 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
18 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
20 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
22 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10   
 
Market 2 
In this market in the event you decline a wage offer you have the option of collecting 
an unemployment benefit equivalent to receiving a 10$/hour wage, you have no 
knowledge of what wages workers in similar positions with similar 
experience/education are receiving, and there is a small probability that you may be 
caught when providing low effort. 
 
Please circle your response in the table below 
Response to Wage Offer Wage Offer 
$/hour Decline                                          Accept/ Effort Level 
22 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
6 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
10 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
16 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
12 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
8 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
14 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
18 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
20 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market 4 
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In this market there is no unemployment insurance, you have knowledge that workers 
in similar positions with similar experience/education are receiving a wage of 14$ per 
hour, and there is a small probability you may be caught when providing low effort. 
  
Please circle your response in the table below 
Response to Wage Offer Wage Offer  
$/hour Decline                                          Accept/ Effort Level 
18 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
16 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
10 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
14 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
8 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
20 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
12 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
22 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
6 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
 
 
Market 4 
In this market there is no unemployment insurance, you have no knowledge of what 
wages workers in similar positions with similar experience/education are receiving, 
and there is a large probability you may be caught when providing low effort. 
          
 Please circle your response in the table below                                
Response to Wage Offer Wage Offer  
$/hour Decline                                          Accept/ Effort Level 
10 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
22 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
6 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
20 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
12 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
8 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
14 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
16 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
18 0                               1       2       3      4      5      6      7       8       9     10    
 
Thank you for completing this survey. If you have any further questions you may 
contact the researcher (Evan Meredith) at Email: eem566@mail.usask.ca  
 
 
 
  
 
Consent Form 
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 You are invited to participate in a study entitled (inset title). Please read this 
form carefully, and feel free to ask questions you might have. 
 
Researcher: Evan Edward Meredith, M.A. student, Department of Economics, 
University of Saskatchewan, (306) 652-4485. 
 
Research Supervisor: Morris Altman, Ph.D., Professor and Department Head, 
Department of Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Arts 820, 
altman@sask.usask.ca, (306) 966-5198. 
 
Purpose and Procedure: This study aims to examine the possible relationship 
between wages and effort provision and the changes that may be brought to this 
relationship brought about through the addition of unemployment benefits and the 
observation of coworkers’ wages. This study will require you to fill out a 
questionnaire and will require from approximately 10 to 15 minutes of your time. 
 
Potential Risks: There are no known risks associated with this study. 
 
Potential Benefits: There are no known potential benefits associated with this study. 
 
Storage of Data: The data collected will contain no identifying information and the 
consent forms will be stored separately from the questionnaires to prevent and 
correlation of names with given responses. All data will be stored by the research 
supervisor for a minimum of 5 years after the completion of the study. 
 
Confidentiality: The data collected in this study will be published and presented at 
seminars, but will be presented in an aggregate form in which no individuals may be 
identified. Consent forms will also be stores separately form the questionnaires to 
prevent individual identification with responses. Please do not put your name or any 
other identifying information on the questionnaires. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You may withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, 
without penalty of any sort (and without loss of relevant entitlements, without 
affecting academic of employment status, without losing access to relevant services, 
etc.), you may refuse to answer individual questions. If you wish to withdraw without 
others knowing you may not fill out the survey, wait, and turn it in when the other 
participants do. If you withdraw from the study at any time any data that you have 
contributed will be destroyed at your request. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please fell free to ask at 
any point; you are also free to contact the researcher at the numbers provided above 
if you have questions at a later time. This study has been approved on ethical grounds 
by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics Board on 
(insert date). Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed 
to that committee through the Office of Research Services (996-2084). Out of town 
participants may call collect. The results of the study may be viewed upon completion 
 108
in the published thesis available in the Department of Economics Library (Timlin 
Room). 
 
 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above; 
I have been provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have 
been answered satisfactorily. I consent to participate in the study described above, 
understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time. A copy of this consent 
form has been given to me for my records.  
 
 
___________________________________   _______________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
 
___________________________________   _______________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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Interested in 
Experimental 
Economics? 
 
 All undergraduates at the University of 
Saskatchewan are needed to participate in a M.A. 
research study investigating the relationship between 
effort and wages. 
Participation will require 10 to 15 minutes of 
your time and will involve the completion of a short 
questionnaire in a classroom on campus. 
 
Location:  Arts 104 
Time: Tuesday, February 21, 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 
      Wednesday, February 22, 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. 
 
If you wish to participate please show up 
anytime during the times mentioned above. If you 
require more information feel free to contact: 
Evan Meredith at 
Email: eem566@mail.usask.ca
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Appendix Two: Full Regression Output 
 
Market One 
 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:40 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -5.610917 0.927130 -6.051920 0.0000 
WAGE 0.955585 0.099024 9.649996 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.016714 0.003438 -4.861587 0.0000 
AGE 0.061627 0.032218 1.912795 0.0562 
FEMALE 1.238158 0.192767 6.423092 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.023635 0.259828 -0.090963 0.9275 
OUTOFCANADA -0.365424 0.221405 -1.650476 0.0993 
NONECONMAJOR -0.160394 0.198366 -0.808573 0.4190 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.111797 0.127231 -0.878693 0.3799 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.367056 0.256131 1.433080 0.1523 
UNIONEXP -0.131304 0.248094 -0.529251 0.5968 
FULLTIME -0.235226 0.214449 -1.096886 0.2731 
R-squared 0.564720     Mean dependent var 5.563588 
Adjusted R-squared 0.558206     S.D. dependent var 3.504828 
S.E. of regression 2.329576     Akaike info criterion 4.545183 
Sum squared resid 3988.788     Schwarz criterion 4.619337 
Log likelihood -1685.626     F-statistic 86.68802 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.758635     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
 
Probit (decline=0,accept=1) 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:50 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -5.944347 0.872219 -6.815200 0.0000 
WAGE 0.651261 0.086529 7.526490 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.015915 0.003235 -4.919980 0.0000 
AGE 0.072535 0.028340 2.559506 0.0105 
FEMALE 0.303663 0.163025 1.862673 0.0625 
OUTOFPROV -0.053484 0.194525 -0.274946 0.7834 
OUTOFCANADA 0.469333 0.215969 2.173146 0.0298 
NONECONMAJOR 0.144645 0.161563 0.895290 0.3706 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.007417 0.093568 -0.079264 0.9368 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.119912 0.232080 0.516686 0.6054 
UNIONEXP -0.361219 0.188466 -1.916628 0.0553 
FULLTIME -0.151783 0.177304 -0.856060 0.3920 
Mean dependent var 0.827309     S.D. dependent var 0.378233 
S.E. of regression 0.282375     Akaike info criterion 0.536229 
Sum squared resid 58.60584     Schwarz criterion 0.610383 
Log likelihood -188.2815     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.564807 
Restr. log likelihood -343.7150     Avg. log likelihood -0.252050 
LR statistic (11 df) 310.8671     McFadden R-squared 0.452216 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 129      Total obs 747 
Obs with Dep=1 618    
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Accepts only 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:43 
Sample: 1 618 
Included observations: 618 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.296004 1.145385 1.131500 0.2583 
WAGE 0.295435 0.128443 2.300133 0.0218 
WAGE^2 0.001417 0.004176 0.339381 0.7344 
AGE 0.027473 0.029040 0.946051 0.3445 
FEMALE 1.256206 0.182743 6.874154 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.015810 0.255385 -0.061906 0.9507 
OUTOFCANADA -0.772365 0.220684 -3.499875 0.0005 
NONECONMAJ -0.259942 0.186130 -1.396560 0.1631 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.138205 0.123148 -1.122262 0.2622 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.304663 0.249853 1.219369 0.2232 
UNIONEXP 0.140595 0.232238 0.605392 0.5451 
FULLTIME -0.147170 0.204771 -0.718705 0.4726 
R-squared 0.416423     Mean dependent var 6.724919 
Adjusted R-squared 0.405830     S.D. dependent var 2.651331 
S.E. of regression 2.043710     Akaike info criterion 4.286637 
Sum squared resid 2531.112     Schwarz criterion 4.372589 
Log likelihood -1312.571     F-statistic 39.31121 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.688385     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
Market two 
 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:46 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -3.494077 0.913349 -3.825566 0.0001 
WAGE 0.843401 0.097922 8.612999 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.011823 0.003483 -3.395021 0.0007 
AGE -0.012295 0.030345 -0.405161 0.6855 
FEMALE 1.251113 0.199441 6.273108 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.525627 0.234196 -2.244385 0.0251 
OUTOFCANADA -0.261051 0.272455 -0.958143 0.3383 
NONECONMAJ -0.299077 0.211691 -1.412799 0.1581 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.276040 0.126751 -2.177809 0.0297 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.420560 0.280311 1.500331 0.1340 
UNIONEXP 0.184064 0.231221 0.796052 0.4263 
FULLTIME -0.436472 0.217328 -2.008353 0.0450 
R-squared 0.579071     Mean dependent var 4.947791 
Adjusted R-squared 0.572772     S.D. dependent var 3.618348 
S.E. of regression 2.365050     Akaike info criterion 4.575409 
Sum squared resid 4111.195     Schwarz criterion 4.649563 
Log likelihood -1696.915     F-statistic 91.92175 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.112361     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Probit(decline=0,accept=1) 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:49 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -4.462143 1.048257 -4.256726 0.0000 
WAGE 0.421477 0.148761 2.833258 0.0046 
WAGE^2 -0.004592 0.006774 -0.677836 0.4979 
AGE 0.033321 0.027466 1.213167 0.2251 
FEMALE 0.480823 0.155403 3.094039 0.0020 
OUTOFPROV -0.361869 0.191977 -1.884959 0.0594 
OUTOFCANADA 0.313009 0.203967 1.534601 0.1249 
NONECONMAJ -0.001143 0.156078 -0.007321 0.9942 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.038657 0.091050 -0.424566 0.6712 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.385206 0.227549 1.692853 0.0905 
UNIONEXP 0.027935 0.178088 0.156862 0.8754 
FULLTIME -0.383753 0.170380 -2.252341 0.0243 
Mean dependent var 0.757697     S.D. dependent var 0.428763 
S.E. of regression 0.299877     Akaike info criterion 0.587282 
Sum squared resid 66.09579     Schwarz criterion 0.661436 
Log likelihood -207.3498     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.615860 
Restr. log likelihood -413.6285     Avg. log likelihood -0.277577 
LR statistic (11 df) 412.5573     McFadden R-squared 0.498705 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 181      Total obs 747 
Obs with Dep=1 566    
 
 
 
Accepts only 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:52 
Sample: 1 566 
Included observations: 566 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 4.603865 1.245752 3.695652 0.0002 
WAGE 0.120647 0.135367 0.891258 0.3732 
WAGE^2 0.006506 0.004400 1.478657 0.1398 
AGE -0.041150 0.033577 -1.225539 0.2209 
FEMALE 1.153121 0.201854 5.712658 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.305124 0.257938 -1.182935 0.2373 
OUTOFCANADA -0.567323 0.274619 -2.065854 0.0393 
NONECONMAJ -0.340237 0.210711 -1.614708 0.1069 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.327299 0.129996 -2.517751 0.0121 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.140702 0.274983 0.511676 0.6091 
UNIONEXP 0.204994 0.234721 0.873351 0.3828 
FULLTIME -0.206587 0.226296 -0.912907 0.3617 
R-squared 0.344342     Mean dependent var 6.530035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.331324     S.D. dependent var 2.633679 
S.E. of regression 2.153629     Akaike info criterion 4.393159 
Sum squared resid 2569.517     Schwarz criterion 4.485143 
Log likelihood -1231.264     F-statistic 26.45025 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.851339     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Market three 
 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:01 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -3.926812 0.912510 -4.303310 0.0000 
WAGE 0.659337 0.100899 6.534602 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.002904 0.003570 -0.813622 0.4161 
AGE 0.023549 0.029487 0.798631 0.4248 
FEMALE 1.113147 0.195365 5.697790 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.702134 0.250542 -2.802458 0.0052 
OUTOFCANADA -0.477061 0.262409 -1.818006 0.0695 
NONECONMAJ -0.302945 0.195187 -1.552075 0.1211 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.266532 0.112106 -2.377494 0.0177 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.657271 0.294736 2.230033 0.0260 
UNIONEXP 0.053165 0.223354 0.238032 0.8119 
FULLTIME -0.407647 0.207538 -1.964209 0.0499 
R-squared 0.635629     Mean dependent var 4.803213 
Adjusted R-squared 0.630175     S.D. dependent var 3.841371 
S.E. of regression 2.336061     Akaike info criterion 4.550743 
Sum squared resid 4011.027     Schwarz criterion 4.624897 
Log likelihood -1687.702     F-statistic 116.5611 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.650725     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
 
 
Probit (decline=0,accept=1) 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:02 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -4.015065 0.896964 -4.476283 0.0000 
WAGE 0.328221 0.126967 2.585096 0.0097 
WAGE^2 -0.002449 0.005512 -0.444398 0.6568 
AGE 0.041519 0.024872 1.669283 0.0951 
FEMALE 0.094005 0.139128 0.675676 0.4992 
OUTOFPROV -0.625010 0.175989 -3.551405 0.0004 
OUTOFCANADA 0.096530 0.192720 0.500883 0.6165 
NONECONMAJ -0.136065 0.143908 -0.945497 0.3444 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.002890 0.081519 -0.035450 0.9717 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.335279 0.210758 1.590822 0.1116 
UNIONEXP -0.120508 0.159712 -0.754534 0.4505 
FULLTIME -0.171300 0.154541 -1.108448 0.2677 
Mean dependent var 0.713521     S.D. dependent var 0.452419 
S.E. of regression 0.325246     Akaike info criterion 0.691137 
Sum squared resid 77.75206     Schwarz criterion 0.765291 
Log likelihood -246.1397     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.719715 
Restr. log likelihood -447.4299     Avg. log likelihood -0.329504 
LR statistic (11 df) 402.5804     McFadden R-squared 0.449881 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 214      Total obs 747 
Obs with Dep=1 533    
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Accepts only 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:03 
Sample: 1 533 
Included observations: 533 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.949618 1.381825 1.410901 0.1589 
WAGE 0.281644 0.156344 1.801441 0.0722 
WAGE^2 0.003646 0.004911 0.742436 0.4582 
AGE -0.009287 0.030726 -0.302247 0.7626 
FEMALE 1.420977 0.189328 7.505381 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.162380 0.277326 -0.585520 0.5585 
OUTOFCANADA -0.778169 0.260274 -2.989806 0.0029 
NONECONMAJ -0.161062 0.195002 -0.825951 0.4092 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.327190 0.109738 -2.981563 0.0030 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.388670 0.290063 1.339951 0.1808 
UNIONEXP 0.242386 0.221258 1.095488 0.2738 
FULLTIME -0.384554 0.204011 -1.884961 0.0600 
R-squared 0.484501     Mean dependent var 6.731707 
Adjusted R-squared 0.473617     S.D. dependent var 2.772256 
S.E. of regression 2.011333     Akaike info criterion 4.257730 
Sum squared resid 2107.686     Schwarz criterion 4.354057 
Log likelihood -1122.685     F-statistic 44.51561 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.292155     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
 
 
Market four 
 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:04 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -5.691308 1.091505 -5.214182 0.0000 
WAGE 0.933379 0.112083 8.327589 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.015689 0.003892 -4.031188 0.0001 
AGE 0.055081 0.036046 1.528066 0.1269 
FEMALE 1.065032 0.194823 5.466655 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.299783 0.268302 -1.117334 0.2642 
OUTOFCANADA -0.604475 0.256772 -2.354128 0.0188 
NONECONMAJ 0.303033 0.226127 1.340102 0.1806 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.037444 0.137977 -0.271379 0.7862 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.317228 0.279092 1.136642 0.2561 
UNIONEXP 0.095399 0.239965 0.397552 0.6911 
FULLTIME -0.419368 0.224627 -1.866950 0.0623 
R-squared 0.518426     Mean dependent var 5.460509 
Adjusted R-squared 0.511219     S.D. dependent var 3.692537 
S.E. of regression 2.581559     Akaike info criterion 4.750598 
Sum squared resid 4898.368     Schwarz criterion 4.824751 
Log likelihood -1762.348     F-statistic 71.93147 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.419839     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Probit (decline=0,accept=1) 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:04 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -8.444085 1.639929 -5.149056 0.0000 
WAGE 0.676444 0.171518 3.943857 0.0001 
WAGE^2 -0.010917 0.006997 -1.560280 0.1187 
AGE 0.149063 0.050956 2.925299 0.0034 
FEMALE 0.668604 0.261541 2.556405 0.0106 
OUTOFPROV -0.962660 0.318857 -3.019096 0.0025 
OUTOFCANADA 0.216014 0.331649 0.651333 0.5148 
NONECONMAJ 0.373905 0.263109 1.421102 0.1553 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.030160 0.156085 -0.193228 0.8468 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.382290 0.359421 1.063626 0.2875 
UNIONEXP -0.254597 0.296044 -0.859997 0.3898 
FULLTIME -0.715678 0.281264 -2.544509 0.0109 
Mean dependent var 0.781794     S.D. dependent var 0.413305 
S.E. of regression 0.321880     Akaike info criterion 0.675150 
Sum squared resid 76.15106     Schwarz criterion 0.749304 
Log likelihood -240.1686     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.703729 
Restr. log likelihood -391.8972     Avg. log likelihood -0.321511 
LR statistic (11 df) 303.4572     McFadden R-squared 0.387164 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 163      Total obs 747 
Obs with Dep=1 584    
 
 
 
Accepts only 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:05 
Sample: 1 584 
Included observations: 584 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2.114737 1.370335 1.543227 0.1233 
WAGE 0.329931 0.145571 2.266469 0.0238 
WAGE^2 -0.000822 0.004625 -0.177653 0.8591 
AGE -0.012802 0.033247 -0.385046 0.7003 
FEMALE 0.875021 0.179485 4.875175 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV 0.425014 0.223488 1.901734 0.0577 
OUTOFCANADA -0.846392 0.255170 -3.316976 0.0010 
NONECONMAJ 0.173977 0.204661 0.850073 0.3956 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.038434 0.125944 -0.305170 0.7603 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.080716 0.253122 0.318884 0.7499 
UNIONEXP 0.256441 0.208348 1.230833 0.2189 
FULLTIME 0.063930 0.212246 0.301210 0.7634 
R-squared 0.364890     Mean dependent var 6.984589 
Adjusted R-squared 0.352677     S.D. dependent var 2.604542 
S.E. of regression 2.095521     Akaike info criterion 4.337815 
Sum squared resid 2511.771     Schwarz criterion 4.427608 
Log likelihood -1254.642     F-statistic 29.87561 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.975296     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Pooled markets (with dummies for the individual markets, market one being the base, and interaction coefficients 
between the market dummies and wage) 
 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/29/06   Time: 13:13 
Sample: 1 2988 
Included observations: 2988 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -3.531146 0.525797 -6.715791 0.0000 
WAGE 0.774085 0.056150 13.78592 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.010667 0.001894 -5.631472 0.0000 
AGE 0.035284 0.016459 2.143830 0.0321 
FEMALE 1.169831 0.096828 12.08153 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.368208 0.126634 -2.907662 0.0037 
OUTOFCANADA -0.403747 0.125250 -3.223540 0.0013 
NONECONMAJ -0.131535 0.104366 -1.260325 0.2077 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.199310 0.062432 -3.192457 0.0014 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.483385 0.140325 3.444751 0.0006 
UNIONEXP*EMPLOYMEN
TEXP 
-0.099005 0.120410 -0.822230 0.4110 
FULLTIME -0.368198 0.107429 -3.427351 0.0006 
EILOWEROREQUAL -1.004359 0.200620 -5.006274 0.0000 
EIHIGHER -0.420743 0.137199 -3.066667 0.0022 
WAGELOWER -1.524015 0.176200 -8.649372 0.0000 
WAGEHIGHER -0.003907 0.140718 -0.027762 0.9779 
WAGEEQUAL -0.727054 0.323625 -2.246596 0.0247 
SUPERVISION -0.102564 0.127279 -0.805822 0.4204 
R-squared 0.579488     Mean dependent var 5.193775 
Adjusted R-squared 0.577081     S.D. dependent var 3.678801 
S.E. of regression 2.392408     Akaike info criterion 4.588483 
Sum squared resid 16999.13     Schwarz criterion 4.624642 
Log likelihood -6837.194     F-statistic 240.7536 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.183804     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
Probit (decline=0,accept=1) 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 06/29/06   Time: 13:12 
Sample: 1 2988 
Included observations: 2988 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -4.255966 0.438579 -9.703989 0.0000 
WAGE 0.445787 0.047465 9.391959 0.0000 
WAGE^2 -0.008907 0.001877 -4.745535 0.0000 
AGE 0.058074 0.014247 4.076117 0.0000 
FEMALE 0.312584 0.074685 4.185383 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.398594 0.090609 -4.399060 0.0000 
OUTOFCANADA 0.245298 0.099695 2.460485 0.0139 
NONECONMAJ 0.031774 0.076923 0.413058 0.6796 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.030971 0.044029 -0.703418 0.4818 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.315072 0.110643 2.847638 0.0044 
UNIONEXP*EMPLOYMEN
TEXP 
-0.227575 0.088025 -2.585346 0.0097 
FULLTIME -0.283184 0.081974 -3.454550 0.0006 
EILOWEROREQUAL -0.646003 0.112571 -5.738630 0.0000 
EIHIGHER 0.030279 0.141770 0.213580 0.8309 
WAGELOWER -0.789016 0.103623 -7.614321 0.0000 
WAGEEQUAL -0.396534 0.207414 -1.911805 0.0559 
WAGEHIGHER 0.013188 0.222687 0.059220 0.9528 
SUPERVISION -0.276557 0.091897 -3.009424 0.0026 
Mean dependent var 0.770080     S.D. dependent var 0.420851 
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S.E. of regression 0.307638     Akaike info criterion 0.604772 
Sum squared resid 281.0846     Schwarz criterion 0.640931 
Log likelihood -885.5292     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.617781 
Restr. log likelihood -1611.068     Avg. log likelihood -0.296362 
LR statistic (17 df) 1451.077     McFadden R-squared 0.450346 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 687      Total obs 2988 
Obs with Dep=1 2301    
 
 
Accepts only 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/29/06   Time: 13:22 
Sample(adjusted): 1 2300 
Included observations: 2300 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 3.049328 0.675236 4.515946 0.0000 
WAGE 0.211618 0.074655 2.834619 0.0046 
WAGE^2 0.003602 0.002378 1.514711 0.1300 
AGE -0.004499 0.016040 -0.280497 0.7791 
FEMALE 1.162586 0.093427 12.44385 0.0000 
OUTOFPROV -0.017326 0.128769 -0.134551 0.8930 
OUTOFCANADA -0.723266 0.124419 -5.813155 0.0000 
NONECONMAJ -0.158094 0.099942 -1.581854 0.1138 
YEAROFSTUDY -0.227652 0.060922 -3.736758 0.0002 
EMPLOYMENTEXP 0.249418 0.134135 1.859452 0.0631 
UNIONEXP*EMPLOYMEN
TEXP 
0.099095 0.115622 0.857056 0.3915 
FULLTIME -0.161931 0.105969 -1.528091 0.1266 
EILOWEROREQUAL -0.243623 0.267533 -0.910625 0.3626 
EIHIGHER -0.434244 0.128399 -3.381983 0.0007 
WAGELOWER -0.897910 0.237234 -3.784917 0.0002 
WAGEEQUAL -0.523200 0.283263 -1.847049 0.0649 
WAGEHIGHER 0.067461 0.130854 0.515546 0.6062 
SUPERVISION 0.173846 0.120576 1.441799 0.1495 
R-squared 0.398916     Mean dependent var 6.743478 
Adjusted R-squared 0.394438     S.D. dependent var 2.667173 
S.E. of regression 2.075536     Akaike info criterion 4.306112 
Sum squared resid 9830.516     Schwarz criterion 4.351038 
Log likelihood -4934.028     F-statistic 89.08682 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.837839     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Prediction Tables 
 
Market one 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:50 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5) 
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 80 34 114 0 0 0 
P(Dep=1)>C 49 584 633 129 618 747 
Total 129 618 747 129 618 747 
Correct 80 584 664 0 618 618 
% Correct 62.02 94.50 88.89 0.00 100.00 82.73 
% Incorrect 37.98 5.50 11.11 100.00 0.00 17.27 
Total Gain* 62.02 -5.50 6.16    
Percent Gain** 62.02 NA 35.66    
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of Dep=0) 70.87 58.51 129.38 22.28 106.72 129.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 58.13 559.49 617.62 106.72 511.28 618.00 
Total 129.00 618.00 747.00 129.00 618.00 747.00 
Correct 70.87 559.49 630.36 22.28 511.28 533.55 
% Correct 54.94 90.53 84.39 17.27 82.73 71.43 
% Incorrect 45.06 9.47 15.61 82.73 17.27 28.57 
Total Gain* 37.67 7.80 12.96    
Percent Gain** 45.53 45.18 45.35    
*Change in "% 
Correct" from 
default (constant 
probability) 
specification 
      
**Percent of 
incorrect 
(default) 
prediction 
corrected by 
equation 
      
 
 
 
 
Market two 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 12:49 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5) 
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 129 42 171 0 0 0 
P(Dep=1)>C 52 524 576 181 566 747 
Total 181 566 747 181 566 747 
Correct 129 524 653 0 566 566 
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% Correct 71.27 92.58 87.42 0.00 100.00 75.77 
% Incorrect 28.73 7.42 12.58 100.00 0.00 24.23 
Total Gain* 71.27 -7.42 11.65    
Percent Gain** 71.27  NA 48.07    
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of Dep=0) 114.57 65.72 180.28 43.86 137.14 181.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 66.43 500.28 566.72 137.14 428.86 566.00 
Total 181.00 566.00 747.00 181.00 566.00 747.00 
Correct 114.57 500.28 614.85 43.86 428.86 472.71 
% Correct 63.30 88.39 82.31 24.23 75.77 63.28 
% Incorrect 36.70 11.61 17.69 75.77 24.23 36.72 
Total Gain* 39.07 12.62 19.03    
Percent Gain** 51.56 52.08 51.82    
*Change in "% 
Correct" from 
default (constant 
probability) 
specification 
      
**Percent of 
incorrect 
(default) 
prediction 
corrected by 
equation 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market three 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:02 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5) 
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 153 50 203 0 0 0 
P(Dep=1)>C 61 483 544 214 533 747 
Total 214 533 747 214 533 747 
Correct 153 483 636 0 533 533 
% Correct 71.50 90.62 85.14 0.00 100.00 71.35 
% Incorrect 28.50 9.38 14.86 100.00 0.00 28.65 
Total Gain* 71.50 -9.38 13.79    
Percent Gain** 71.50 NA 48.13    
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of Dep=0) 135.49 78.51 214.00 61.31 152.69 214.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 78.51 454.49 533.00 152.69 380.31 533.00 
Total 214.00 533.00 747.00 214.00 533.00 747.00 
Correct 135.49 454.49 589.99 61.31 380.31 441.61 
% Correct 63.31 85.27 78.98 28.65 71.35 59.12 
% Incorrect 36.69 14.73 21.02 71.35 28.65 40.88 
Total Gain* 34.67 13.92 19.86    
Percent Gain** 48.59 48.59 48.59    
*Change in "% 
Correct" from 
default (constant 
probability) 
specification 
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**Percent of 
incorrect 
(default) 
prediction 
corrected by 
equation 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market four 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:04 
Sample: 1 747 
Included observations: 747 
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5) 
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 93 42 135 0 0 0 
P(Dep=1)>C 70 542 612 163 584 747 
Total 163 584 747 163 584 747 
Correct 93 542 635 0 584 584 
% Correct 57.06 92.81 85.01 0.00 100.00 78.18 
% Incorrect 42.94 7.19 14.99 100.00 0.00 21.82 
Total Gain* 57.06 -7.19 6.83    
Percent Gain** 57.06 NA 31.29    
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of Dep=0) 87.37 75.63 163.00 35.57 127.43 163.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 75.63 508.37 584.00 127.43 456.57 584.00 
Total 163.00 584.00 747.00 163.00 584.00 747.00 
Correct 87.37 508.37 595.73 35.57 456.57 492.14 
% Correct 53.60 87.05 79.75 21.82 78.18 65.88 
% Incorrect 46.40 12.95 20.25 78.18 21.82 34.12 
Total Gain* 31.78 8.87 13.87    
Percent Gain** 40.65 40.65 40.65    
*Change in "% 
Correct" from 
default (constant 
probability) 
specification 
      
**Percent of 
incorrect 
(default) 
prediction 
corrected by 
equation 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled markets 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPT 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Date: 04/04/06   Time: 13:07 
Sample: 1 2988 
Included observations: 2988 
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Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5) 
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 447 163 610 0 0 0 
P(Dep=1)>C 240 2138 2378 687 2301 2988 
Total 687 2301 2988 687 2301 2988 
Correct 447 2138 2585 0 2301 2301 
% Correct 65.07 92.92 86.51 0.00 100.00 77.01 
% Incorrect 34.93 7.08 13.49 100.00 0.00 22.99 
Total Gain* 65.07 -7.08 9.50    
Percent Gain** 65.07 NA 41.34    
            Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of Dep=0) 402.06 284.61 686.67 157.95 529.05 687.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 284.94 2016.39 2301.33 529.05 1771.95 2301.00 
Total 687.00 2301.00 2988.00 687.00 2301.00 2988.00 
Correct 402.06 2016.39 2418.44 157.95 1771.95 1929.91 
% Correct 58.52 87.63 80.94 22.99 77.01 64.59 
% Incorrect 41.48 12.37 19.06 77.01 22.99 35.41 
Total Gain* 35.53 10.62 16.35    
Percent Gain** 46.14 46.20 46.17    
*Change in "% 
Correct" from 
default (constant 
probability) 
specification 
      
**Percent of 
incorrect 
(default) 
prediction 
corrected by 
equation 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-Stats testing joint significance of WAGE variables 
 
EQ1 
 
Market one  
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 446.8434     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 594.3571     Probability 0.000000
 
Market two 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 472.5352     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 617.5602     Probability 0.000000
 
Market three 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 610.0845     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 730.8360     Probability 0.000000
 
Market four 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 372.3778     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 522.7220     Probability 0.000000
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Pooled Markets 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 WAGE*EIOPTION WAGE 
        *COWORKERWAGE WAGE*SUPERVISION 
F-statistic 750.0637     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 2439.922     Probability 0.000000
 
 
 
EQ2 
 
Market one 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 290.9747     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 297.1613     Probability 0.000000
 
Market two 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 380.9822     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 399.2292     Probability 0.000000
 
Market three 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 340.8463     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 389.3476     Probability 0.000000
 
Market four 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 226.5114     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 277.2598     Probability 0.000000
 
Pooled markets 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 1200.865     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 1339.225     Probability 0.000000
 
 
 
EQ3 
 
Market one 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 179.5923     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 287.6416     Probability 0.000000
 
Market two 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 119.3616     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 202.8031     Probability 0.000000
 
Market three 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 190.5190     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 292.5673     Probability 0.000000
 
Market four 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 
F-statistic 131.2760     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 220.6095     Probability 0.000000
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Pooled markets 
Redundant Variables: WAGE WAGE^2 WAGE*EIOPTION WAGE 
        *COWORKERWAGE WAGE*SUPERVISION 
F-statistic 245.9782     Probability 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 991.6135     Probability 0.000000
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Appendix Three: Mathematical Appendix 
The t-stat for the elasticity in the pooled market regressions is calculated in the 
following manner. 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1
2
2
21
22
2
22
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
i
i
21
21
2
E
WElasticity
equations following  theyieldingmanner similar  ain  calculated 
becan  elasticity  theof  variance theand elasticity  themarkets seperate For the
,4,2
,4varvar4var
2
E
Wvar)elasticityvar(
manner following in the estimated becan  and scovariance and  variances theknow
  which weof  variablesofnumber  a offunction linear  a  thereforeis elasticity The
2
E
W
equal  toexpanded becan equation  This variables.
  theseof means  thedenote  variablesoverlined  theusual, As variable.
dummy market relevant   theis D and abledummy varimarket relevant   the
ont coefficien  theis   variable, wagesquared on thet coefficien 
 theis   variable, wageon thet coefficien  theis  Where
2  Elasticity  :Therefore
means. at the evaluated  are selasticice All  examined. being
 elasticity  theorelevant t model ceconometri ted theestimais wage
 respect toh effort wit of derivative  thegenerate  tousedequation  The
 wage theis  wandeffort  is e Where
w
eElasticity
ββ
γβγβ
ββγββ
γββ
γββ
γ
ββ
γββ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛++=
∂
∂=
E
W
Cov
E
WD
E
WCov
E
W
E
WD
Cov
E
W
E
W
E
WD
E
W
E
W
E
WD
E
W
E
WD
E
W
E
WDW
e
w
iiiii
ii
ii
ii
ii
 
 
 
 127
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )ε
ε
ββββ
ˆvar
1ˆ
asgiven  is 1Elasticity of hypothesis nullunder  calculatedstat -T
,cov4var4var
E
Wcity)Var(Elasti 21
2
2
22
2
2
−=
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
E
W
E
W
E
W
 
 
Table of calculated t-stats for elasticity of effort w.r.t. wage 
 
 
Market Pooled markets 
1 2 3 4 
EQ1 
(first model/OLS) 
5.985320 8.346211 12.207426 7.023254
EQ2 (conditional 
model/second stage) 
-5.2739 -8.168344 -2.608616 -8.498023
 
 
Market  Separate markets 
1 2 3 4 
EQ1  
(first model/OLS) 
6.629631 11.142921 16.54029 6.388151
EQ2(conditional 
model/second stage) 
-6.482984 -3.927957 -0.951023 -6.156875
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